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Nikolaus
Wachsmann.
Hitler's Prisons: Legal Terror in Nazi Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Reviewed by: George C. Browder, Emeritus, Department of History, State University of New York at Fredonia.

Legal vs. Extra-Legal Terror in the Dual State

Nicholas Wachsmann, lecturer at Sheffield University, revises our commonly held perceptions of the conflict between the legal-judicial bureaucracy of the Third Reich and its SS-police system. With this revision comes the revelation that until well into the war, the regular penal system under the Ministry of Justice held far more prisoners than the SS concentration camps, serving to house and brutalize every category of victims of Nazi terror. Since the regular penal system of Nazi Germany has been largely ignored, especially outside Germany, Wachsmann's contribution is doubly significant. He writes: "[T]he legal apparatus fulfilled several vital functions in the Third Reich: it preserved a degree of legal stability in some areas, it could be blamed for the failure of the homogenous 'national community' to materialize, it legitimized the regime, and it helped in the brutal repression of 'community aliens'. For all the misgivings of the Nazi leaders, the legal apparatus was a fundamental pillar of the Nazi dictatorship and the prisons were very much Hitler's prisons.... If this contribution of the legal apparatus is overlooked, the view of Nazi terror inside Germany will inevitably be lopsided". This quote constitutes the central claim of the book.



Roland Freisler (October 30, 1893 – February 3, 1945) was a prominent Nazi. He became State Secretary at the Reich Ministry of Justice and President of the Volksgerichtshof, a court handling political crimes.

 

In contrast to most of the Nazi leadership, little beyond basic details is known about Roland Freisler the man. He was born in Celle, the son of an engineer, and saw active service during World War I: he was an officer cadet in 1914, and by 1915 he was a lieutenant and was decorated before becoming a prisoner of war in Russia in October 1915. While interned in Russia, he learned the language and developed an interest in Marxism. He returned to Germany in 1920 a fanatical Communist to study law at Jena University, becoming a Doctor of Law in 1922. From 1924 he worked as a lawyer in Kassel and also as a city councilor for the Völkisch-Social bloc. He joined the Nazi Party in July 1925. During this period, he served as defense counsel for members of the nascent Party who got into trouble with the law. He was also a delegate to the Prussian Landtag, or state legislature, and later he became a member of the Reichstag.

 

In 1927 the Gauleiter of the Gau Kurhessen characterized Freisler in the following manner: "Rhetorically he is equal to our best speakers, if not superior to them. Particularly on the broad masses, he has influence, but thinking people mostly reject him deep down. Party Comrade Freisler is only usable as a speaker. He is unsuitable for any leadership post, since he is unreliable and is a moody person."

 

In 1933 and 1934 he was State Secretary in the Prussian Ministry of Justice, and in the Reich Ministry of Justice between 1934 and 1942; he represented the latter at the Wannsee Conference, where he stood in for Franz Schlegelberger. His absolute mastery of legal texts, mental agility and overwhelming verbal force jelled with strict adherence to the party line and the corresponding misanthropic ideology, so that he became the most feared judge and the personification of the Nazis' "blood justice." Despite his undisputed legal competence, he could not rise further. According to Uwe Wesel, this can be attributed to two factors:

 

Freisler was regarded as a lone fighter and had no influential patron at his disposal who could have championed him.


In the eyes of the Nazi elite, Freisler was compromised by his brother Oswald's rise to prominence. Oswald Freisler committed offense against the party line appearing as defense counsel, in politically significant trials which the Nazi regime sought to debase for propaganda purposes. In so doing, he wore his Nazi Party badge in a clearly visible way, which made an unambiguous interpretation of the party's position more difficult. Propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels accordingly reproved Roland Freisler and reported the incident to Hitler, who, for his part, decreed the immediate exclusion of Oswald Freisler from the party.


On August 20, 1942, Hitler promoted Otto Thierack to Reich Justice Minister and named Freisler to succeed Thierack as president of the Volksgerichtshof ("People's Court"). This court had jurisdiction over a rather broad array of "political offenses", which included crimes like black marketeering, work slowdowns, and defeatism. These crimes were viewed by Freisler's court as Wehrkraftzersetzung ("destruction of defensive capability") and were accordingly punished severely, the death penalty being meted out in numerous cases.

 

The number of death sentences rose sharply under Freisler's stewardship. Approximately 90% of all proceedings ended with sentences of death or life imprisonment, the sentences frequently having been determined before the trial. Between 1942 and 1945 more than 5000 death sentences were handed out, and of these, 2600 through the court's First Senate, which Freisler headed. Thus, Freisler alone was responsible, in his three years on the court, for as many death sentences as all other senate sessions of the court together in the entire time the court existed, between 1934 and 1945.

 

Freisler acted as judge, prosecutor and jury all embodied in a single person. He was particularly known for humiliating defendants and barking loudly at them. A number of the trials for defendants in the July 20 plot before the People's Court were filmed and recorded. In the 1944 trial against Wilhelm Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, for example, Freisler screamed so loudly, the technicians who were filming the proceeding had major problems making the defendants' words audible. Count Schwerin, like many other defendants in the plot, was sentenced to death by hanging. Among this and other show trials, Freisler headed the 1943 proceedings against the members of the "White Rose" resistance group.

 

Freisler chaired the First Senate of the People's Court. Insofar as he led the proceedings, he designated himself as court reporter. That way, he was also responsible for the composition of written grounds for the sentences, that he wrote up in his own unique fashion, namely in accordance with his own notions of a "National Socialist criminal court." Meanwhile, he introduced judgment advisories with remarks like "Off with his head," and "The beet must be uprooted," and so forth.

 

During an Allied air raid on Berlin on February 3, 1945, Freisler was fatally struck by a beam in the cellar of the courthouse. His body was found crushed beneath a fallen masonry column, clutching the file on anti-Hitler conspirator Fabian von Schlabrendorff.


The National Socialist terror apparatus consisted essentially of four complexes: the police, controlled by the SS; the concentration camp system, also controlled by the SS; the Security Service (SD) of the Reichsführer-SS Himmler; and the criminal justice system for political offenders. The main instruments of the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei, Secret State Police) were "protective custody" and "special treatment". "Protective custody", which was predominantly carried out in a concentration camp, allowed indeterminate imprisonment without sentencing. "Special treatment" was the term that disguised the administratively ordered execution of prisoners. It was introduced at the beginning of the war. The police were now pursuers of law-breakers, they were judges, and they were executioners all rolled into one. The justice system for political offences included all the institutions of criminal justice, from the local courts to the Supreme Court of the German Reich. Special institutions were the Sondergerichte (Special Courts), created as early as 1933, and the Volksgerichtshof (People's Court) created in 1934. From 1933 to 1945 civil courts pronounced 16,650 death sentences, ca. 95% during the war. The military courts pronounced an additional ca. 25,000 death sentences. The number of victims of the police justice system is unknown. At the beginning of the war, the Gestapo, the criminal investigation police, and the Security Service were combined into the Reich Security Main Office. This became the central office for the war of annihilation. The so-called Senior SS and Police Officers were assigned to the occupied territories. With a minimum of bureaucracy they could draw upon all the divisions of the SS and police and hence became generals of the extermination war and organizers of the "Final Solution to the Jewish Problem".

Following World War II, the legal apparatus, like the military, managed to maintain the myth of its relatively insignificant involvement in Nazi terror. Like the military, individuals involved in it even claimed some degree of victimization. Their complicity was usually dismissed as a result of the positivist legal tradition in Germany, which allegedly prevented anything like judicial "activism" to curb the growth of the Nazi police state. Until a new generation of jurists replaced the holdovers from the Weimar-Nazi eras who had written the early studies, and until historians rather than jurists attacked the issue, the relationship between the legal system, the police, and the regime remained largely unexplored. Only after the late 1980s did German scholars begin in-depth analysis of this area, and it has been largely ignored outside the field of legal history. Building on this body of scholarship, with extensive work in the vast archival and published primary sources, and exploiting most of the secondary work on the Nazi police state, Wachsmann offers the English-speaking readership its first opportunity to balance its understanding of the entire repression and control system.

Without sacrificing either sophisticated analysis or any complexity, Wachsmann has written a book that should be accessible to general reader and specialist alike. The only thing that might stand in the way of the general reader's enjoyment is the author's occasional assay into nuanced debates with other scholars. Much of Wachsmann's contribution consists either of corrections to or expansions on other works focusing on the regular legal system--no mean achievement. The major force of his new perspective, however, is directed at those of us who ignored the regular legal system's full role in the Nazi police state and relied on unexamined traditions about their conservative resistance to the emergence of the extra-legal police state.

Although this book has a chronological format, beginning with a chapter on Weimar background and ending with the wholesale terror and the extermination of prisoners at the end of the Third Reich, a topical division is also at work. The history of each sub-theme, such as sterilization, receives its own chronological narrative. In the continuity versus aberration debate, Wachsmann comes down more on the side of continuity, repeatedly tracing the origins of Nazi criminology and penology back through the Weimar era into the Wilhelmine Empire. Yet his is no Sonderweg path of inevitability, for he delineates the debates over crime and punishment as being as controversial and divisive as they were in other western societies. Nor were these divisions consistently found between regressive versus modernist or left versus right worldviews. Indeed, the right-nationalist sympathies of judges and prison administrators did prevail as often as not over Weimar-era prison reform efforts. Yet the double-edged complexities of modern reform movements included calls for the elimination from society of asocials and habitual criminals--"scientific" social-management schemes that lay at the heart of later Nazi proactive crime-fighting programs. Even the SPD had been wooed by some of the arguments for "scientific reforms and practices" that became the core of Nazi terrorist law-enforcement.

Wachsmann demonstrates these points effectively, writing that "[i]mportant aspects of the Weimar prison in the 1920s clearly run counter to the evolution of social policy as depicted by historians such as Detlav Peukert".[1] That era's legal and penal programs exhibited tendencies toward both reform and repression. "Overall," Wachsmann claims, "despite some important changes, the structure of the German penal system was not radically transformed in the 1920s". Legislative drafts "envisaged the internment of non-criminal social outsiders such as alcoholics, prostitutes and the homeless". Sterilization was debated as the solution to the problem of "degenerates." As calls for elimination of such elements intensified, the right-wing press and politicians accused more progressive German states of turning the prisons into sanatoriums and pampering the inmates, who allegedly lived better than honest working-class citizens. Public fascination with crime and punishment and its sensationalization by newspapers and the entertainment media fueled the political polemic in which the Nazis ultimately prevailed.

The book has two main foci: the officials of the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary and their interactions with Hitler and the Nazi elite, but especially Himmler's SS and police system; and the penal system and its personnel, particularly with regard to prison conditions and the lives of the prisoners. Another theme is the wide range of categories of "offenders" prosecuted (or persecuted) by both the legal and police systems. Wachsmann analyzes each category, thoroughly describing its social composition, public perceptions, Nazi intentions, and how its fate evolved. Finally Wachsmann seeks to put the Nazi police state in perspective. Successor systems in the FRG and GDR are contrasted, especially with regard to the respective fates of the former officials. Brief attention is also paid to a comparison with western and Soviet systems.

Wachsmann consistently points to the significance of Hitler and his personal fixations, especially his disdain for lawyers and the courts, as the primary driving force behind National Socialist policy. Hitler backed the emergence of the SS-police state, enabling it to become increasingly ruthless and unrestrained, moving beyond the law as an instrument for fighting all "community aliens." Although he and other leading Nazis had little regard for the legal apparatus, it served several important purposes. The judiciary and prison officials were minimally purged, but then came under constant pressure to become an instrument of service to the "national community" rather than "abstract legal principles." Nevertheless, according to Wachsmann, "[t]he Third Reich did not become an all-out police state". The regular legal system survived to the end.

Wachsmann thus totally destroys the idea that the Ministry of Justice under Franz Gürtner resisted the expansion of Himmler's SS and police state on principle, along with their corresponding ability to stand above the law and due process. Concerns that the public's faith in the legal system would be undermined aside, the conflicts over the expanding police powers were primarily a turf war. To the extent that the police never gained control over the penal system, as in some other police states, the lawyers won that war. But they won it at the expense of converting the penal system into as effective an instrument of terror as any Nazi could ever have imagined. Furthermore, jurists thoroughly collaborated with the police, conforming to every demand Hitler made of the justice system. To prevent the protective custody seizure of an accused individual if he had been acquitted by the courts or given too lenient a sentence, the judiciary escalated its conviction rates (regardless of the evidence) and increased the severity of its sentences.

The behavior of justice officials from the ministry through the judiciary down to prison officials and warders reveals how deep the convictions of pseudo-scientific racial-biological thinking had become, even outside National Socialist circles. Even the non-Nazi jurists and prison officials reacted favorably to party pressure to get tough on the "undesirable elements of society," to the point of bending or exceeding the law. They accepted police torture of suspects, only demanding its standardization. They even saw the extralegal system of concentration camps as an appropriate measure for dealing with "true threats" to society. They collaborated with the police by turning over inmates who had completed their sentences but whom they perceived to present a continued threat. By no means were such attitudes restricted to the judges of the special courts and the People's Courts. Noting that these courts have drawn most of the historians' attention, adding to the impression that the rest of the legal system had to have been more normative, Wachsmann argues that they "should not be pictured as a 'revolutionary tribunal' that was not a 'true part of the justice system'". Legal-police relations were "characterized by compromise, cooperation and conflict, with the former two dominating the prewar period.... In many cases, the legal system actually helped to facilitate police detention" (p. 184). Ten charts graphically illustrate the wartime escalation of judicial action against the victims of Nazi "righteous justice" and hate.

Wachsmann also refutes the idea that the appointment of Otto-Georg Thierack as Minister of Justice in 1942 represented a turning point when the law "was finally perverted and unconditionally subordinated to the aims of the regime". Such arguments have provided an alibi for the rest of the legal bureaucracy--instead, Wachsmann argues, Thierack merely accelerated the process that all served, ultimately accepting an emerging reality that left to the police "the internment of 'incorrigible' Germans and the punishment of 'racial aliens'. Basically, the legal system participated in police exterminations only when the police thought that a public trial would serve a purpose. Nevertheless, Thierack had to deal with many asocial elements and "racial aliens" already inside his prisons. From the date of his appointment, he began arranging for their transfer to the camp system for extermination through labor, sealing the fate of more than 20,000 prisoners, including the disabled.

Despite this stark impression, however, Wachsmann's treatment of Ministry Justice officials, judges, prison administrators and warders is appropriately nuanced. The fanatics, the sadists, the more normatively prejudiced and harsh, the dutifully diligent, the too easily pressured, the more conventionally restrained, and the occasionally humane and conscientious are all represented. The full range of motivations for getting caught up in and carried away with National Socialist excesses emerges in his analysis. The (unfortunately) rare occasions on which individuals successfully resisted escalations on principle also find their place in the story.

Wachsmann's analysis of the German penal system is a primer for anyone needing an introduction. All National Socialist normal penal institutions were carried over from the Weimar era, many even from the Wilhelmine period, and Wachsmann traces their evolution throughout. For in-depth perspective, he conducted three case studies: Untermassfeld, a former castle and one of the oldest institutions; Brandenburg-Goerden, the largest and a Weimar construction with the most modern facilities; and Aichach, an exclusively woman's facility. Going beyond institutional analysis, including the administrators and warders, he provides frequent pictures of the history, life behind bars, and the ultimate fate of a wide range of inmates based on memoirs, post-war testimonies, and inmate files.

His findings are grim. Re-education efforts were directed at inmates judged redeemable, with relatively little success. Schooling was minimal, with heavy doses of propaganda; ironically the national-conservative bent of officials led to some increased religious instruction. Nevertheless, discipline and harsh living and working conditions were seen as the real means for discouraging recidivism. Often police conducted such close monitoring of the released that they were unable to hold jobs or housing and were thus driven back to crime. Changes in the economy effected prison conditions unevenly. When police stepped up campaigns for incarcerating political and asocial "enemies," overcrowding and reduced rations led to a general decline. At first the depression retarded the use of productive prison labor, but the Five Year Plan and the increasing demands brought by the war led to maximum--and often deadly or debilitating--exploitation. Only from 1943 did internment in concentration camps (apart from death camps) exceed the population of the regular penal system. By then prison conditions had become increasingly deadly. During the war, perhaps 20,000 prisoners simply died, not counting executions. Although government policy, diminishing resources, and the breakdown of the national infrastructure were responsible, prison officials failed to mitigate the decline. At their worst, however, the regular prisons never equaled the horror and lethality of the camps. Imminent liberation of the prisons led to mass evacuations, even death marches and the murder of inmates whom their keepers could not bear to see released. Amid the chaos, however, even specific orders from above could not guarantee death. With the breakdown, individual personalities were free to emerge. Some officials acted with excessive cruelty or ideological zeal, while others, for a wide variety of reasons, spared the intended victims.

Despite all the strengths of the book, critical readers will notice that Wachsmann himself is not immune to overgeneralizations from secondary sources. For example, as part of his otherwise appropriate emphasis on Hitler's importance in setting the tone for "justice" in the Third Reich, he blames Hitler for intensifying the persecution of homosexuals. His entire basis for this judgment is Ian Kershaw's biography, which never draws such a specific conclusion. [2] He ignores differing conclusions in most of the literature on persecution of homosexuals, some of which he cites elsewhere. Given the scope of this book, he may be excused from such occasional reliance on one or two more general sources for conclusions where the specialized literature would be more appropriate. On one serious point, however, Wachsmann's book is likely to become the source of the very kind of unfortunate and misleading overgeneralizations he has so successfully refined. Here I am thinking of his conclusion: "The Third Reich did not become an all-out police state" (pp. 69, 372)--a statement that will inevitably lead to quotation out of context.

Wachsmann's attempt to put his study in perspective with the concept of the dual state does not help this issue. In order to make this case, he writes, "[t]o sum up, the picture of the police and legal system as two antagonistic and competing agencies of the Nazi state, subscribed to by numerous historians, is not particularly persuasive. Not only does this picture fail to encapsulate fully the complicity of the legal authorities in Nazi terror, it also rather misreads the work of Ernst Fraenkel."[3] Tendencies to identify the legal system with Fraenkel's "Normative State" and the SS-police-camp system with his "Prerogative State" are oversimplifications of Fraenkel's work that conform "to the popular, rather charitable image of the legal system in the Third Reich". In fact, "Fraenkel did not simply equate the Normative State with the legal system. True, Fraenkel did see many courts--especially in civil law--as part of the Normative State, 'responsible for seeing that the principles of the capitalist order were maintained'.... However, Fraenkel made clear that other courts actually gave explicit backing to the actions of the Prerogative State, suspending legal rights. These courts, which based their decisions on political considerations, therefore belonged to the Prerogative State themselves.... Following Fraenkel, it is clear that the legal apparatus combined elements of the Normative and Prerogative State. It maintained some degree of social and economic order for the majority of the population, preventing the Third Reich from descending into complete anarchy. Even the Nazi leadership regarded an element of legal predictability as necessary for the functioning of the dictatorship.... Over time, the remaining normative elements within the legal apparatus became weaker, as more and more matters were defined as political." So far so good, but then Wachsmann adds, "The Dual State gradually disappeared".

This last statement seems to contradict his conclusion about the unachieved all-out police state. Instead we are left with a conclusion that not only begs the question of what an "all-out police state" is, but seems to obscure the full force of Wachsmann's study. Was Stalin's the only all-out police state? According to Wachsmann, in contrast to Nazi Germany, Russia had "no real tradition of abstract law," "[l]egal consciousness was poorly developed among the population," Soviet legal officials "were untrained and poorly educated party members," and "all prisons, camps and forced labor colonies were controlled by the NKVD". If the Nazi police state that Wachsmann describes was not "all-out," why not? Surely an all-out police state does not have to threaten every single citizen with totally unpredictable terror at all times. Our best understandings of how Hitler's system developed have made the point that Wachsmann himself fully develops--that the majority of the population accepted and even supported it because it claimed successfully to provide them the order and security they desired. Rather than threatening them, it merely reinforced their natural tendencies to conform and focus on their own affairs. "All-out, unpredictable terror" and an "all-out police state" are simply not the same thing. As Wachsmann repeatedly argues, the survival of some modicum of conventional legality was essential to the Nazi system, and in no way impeded the veritably unlimited fulfillment of the "the Führer's will."

Should this fine book gain the wide-spread public attention it deserves, one wonders just how it will be received in the heated, current debates over U.S. domestic security, capital punishment, correctional policy, interrogation, and the wars on terrorism, drugs, crime, sex offenders, and illegal immigrants.

Notes

[1]. Detlav Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (London: Allen Lane, 1993).

[2]. Ian Kershaw, Hitler. 1889-1936: Hubris (London: Penguin Books, 1998).

[3]. Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State. A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York: Octagon Books, 1941).


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The reality of what the concentration camp system was all about was reform, not torture and repression. The devastation in Dachau and other camps came about at the end of the war as a result not of a mass extermination policy by the Germans but because of a lack of food and medical supplies, the spread of typhus and a breakdown in sanitation.


Here's a fascinating look at the concentration camp system inside Germany, devoid of the hysteria often associated with the subject in Hollywood films and in the "mainstream" media and academia. This may be the first-ever detailed examination of the concentration camp system, presenting a far different picture from what we've been told.


The Facts About the Origins of the Concentration Camps and Their Administration

Article from The Barnes Review, Jan./Feb. 2001

By Stephen A. Raper, BS (hist/pol.sc.)

 

In propagating a politicized view of German history many in the media and academia have attempted to portray the German system of imprisonment in concentration camps as some sort of precursor to genocide, as a living hell where it was official German policy to make life miserable and to victimize, beat, torture, rape and murder innocent civilians simply because of religious or political persuasion or sexual orientation.

 

Is this sensational view of history correct? No, the role of German concentration camps was much different and probably better in many ways than the American prison system today. German concentration camps had a much more positive role to play in Hitler's new and progressive National Socialist state.

 

The facts will bear out that the Establishment historians have purveyed a view of concentration camp life that cannot be substantiated.

 

The daily life in a concentration camp was much different than most historians will admit.

 

In 1948, Paul Rassinier, a former Socialist and critic of National Socialist Germany who had himself been interned in the concentration camps of Buchenwald and Dora, published Crossing the Line (Le Passage de la Ligne). In this work, Rassinier claimed that the Germans had been benign, if not positive, in their motives for putting enemies of Hitler's National Socialist state in concentration camps. Rassinier claimed that the concentration camps were a "gesture of compassion" since inmates had been placed where they could "not hurt the new regime and where they could be protected from the public anger."

 

Not only did the concentration camps protect anti-social elements in Rassinier's view, but they were also designed to "rehabilitate the strayed sheep and to bring them back to a healthier concept of the German community." 1 According to Rassinier, the German government was helping those whom it committed to concentration camps by putting them in a setting so that they could be rehabilitated into more productive members of the German community.

 

Those who fell into the categories of persons assigned to concentration camps included any person condemned for treasonable activities, as well as Communist Party officials and anyone who incited a German citizen to refuse military service.2 Persons who were considered by the authorities of the Third Reich as being an anti-social malefactor were also sent to the camps. Anti-social malefactors consisted of professional and habitual criminals, that is, those people who had been sentenced to a minimum of six months imprisonment or hard labor on at least three separate occasions. Anti-social malefactors also specifically included beggars, prostitutes, homosexuals, drunkards, psychopaths and lunatics.3 Persons who were "work shy" were also sent to concentration camps. According to Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, work shy meant unemployed men who "could be proved to have refused without adequate reason employment offered to them on two occasions."4

 

The first persons arrested and sent to concentration camps were communists who had taken part in efforts to undermine the fabric of the German state. Most of these communists arrested were denounced to local authorities by fellow workers and neighbors who were concerned about their activities.

 

During March and April 1933, the German people reported the activities of over 10,000 communists in Germany. Given the large membership and well-organized activities of the German Communist Party (KPD), the local jails were soon filled, and the National Socialist government in Berlin was forced to decide where to house these persons, who were a clear and present danger to the continuation of Germany as an independent and sovereign nation. With the jails and prisons filled to capacity, local officials began to take over abandoned warehouses and factories to hold the communists. These makeshift holding facilities have since become known as "wild concentration camps" since they were spur-of-the-moment inventions.

 

The name "concentration camp" simply means an area where dangerous elements are concentrated. Hitler once said the idea for concentration camps came from his studies of the Boer War in South Africa.5

 

During that war, the British built camps and concentrated women and children of Dutch ancestry. During their confinement in British concentration camps, over 26,000 died mainly of starvation, since the British made no effort to feed the unarmed and helpless women, nor did they allow them to leave and go back to their farmsteads. This action of the British against unarmed women and children mainly goes overlooked by Establishment historians, who instead accuse the German concentration camps of being death camps whose sole purpose was killing unarmed civilians. But this is not the case.

 

The first official concentration camp set up in Germany was established about 12 miles from Munich in the town of Dachau, inside a former gunpowder factory, on March 22, 1933. Unlike what Allied propaganda would have us believe, the Germans were not ashamed of this camp. In fact, Heinrich Himmler held a press conference to announce its opening two days before the first inmates were scheduled to arrive. His announcement was carried in German newspapers,6 and the camp was opened with the arrival of 200 communists. But the camp was built to hold 5,000 and was mainly established to act as a deterrent to further communist activity.

 

Himmler stated that it was his promise not to wait until crimes were committed before arresting criminals, and pledged that, in order to protect the populace, professional criminals who had been sentenced many times would be pursued more ruthlessly than before and isolated away from the German people by being incarcerated in concentration camps. Himmler also added that his camps were to be models of cleanliness, order and instruction. It was through this instruction that Himmler hoped to re-educate minor criminals as well as communists. Himmler had ordered strong disciplinary measures to be employed, but the treatment inmates received was just, and they learned trades through their work and training. In the concentration camps, the motto was: "There is one way to freedom. Its milestones are: obedience, zeal, honesty, order, cleanliness, temperance, truth, sense of sacrifice and love for the Fatherland."7

 

In the Soviet Union's "model" of socialism, the German communists found what they were looking for: liberalism, urbanism, and modernism - all of which rejected the traditional Aryan-German way of life. For this reason, the German communists looked at Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship by President Paul von Hindenburg as a signal for an uprising aimed at creating a German soviet state, closely modeled on the Soviet Union and taking its orders from the Comintern in Moscow. But Hitler saw the threat the communists posed to German society, and after the burning of the Reichstag by a communist, he reacted swiftly to take them into custody. Hitler now decided to build the first concentration camps.

 

However, instead of being vindictive or out to do harm to the communists, the concentration camp at Dachau was designed to reform them and make them into citizens that the Germans could be proud of - citizens who could return to German society at large and live out their lives as peaceful and proper German men and women. Instead of being an institution aimed at punishment, the German system of concentration camps was designed to reform and to reeducate enemies of the new German state.

 

A correspondent for The New York Times was allowed to visit Dachau shortly after it was opened and came away with the impression that the commandant of the camp, Theodor Eicke, and the men under his command took their job of reeducation seriously.

They honestly and sincerely believed that their task was pedagogic rather than punitive.... They felt sincerely sorry for the misguided non-Nazis who had not yet found the true faith. 8

Not only had the inmates not yet found faith in the leadership of Adolf Hitler, but they also took part in or supported subversive activities aimed at overthrowing the state.

 

An internal document written in 1934 and circulated at Gestapo headquarters stated that National Socialist Germany would not be complete until its opponents learned to support it and identify with the goals of the German community at large. The writer of the document reiterated the educational value and ideological indoctrination that the camps were to instill in the inmates, and suggested imbuing the inmates with the knowledge that upon their release they would be able to become full members of German society.9 Just a short time later, another Gestapo document warned all state authorities not to harass released inmates so as not to make their complete re-integration into German society difficult.10

 

The Germans themselves often referred to these camps as "education camps." In the summer of 1942, three years after World War II began, Himmler was still emphasizing the re-educational aspects of the camps when he wrote a letter to Oswald Pohl.11 The language that he used in this letter was also given as part of official instructions to guards at the camps. Himmler instructed each guard to make his behavior a personal example to the prisoners, in order to imbue them with respect for the National Socialist state and to teach them how to behave properly.12 This re-education at the camps was to stress traditional Aryan virtues, such as hard work, strict discipline, a belief in law and order, support for the complete family and respect for traditional German society, as well as encouraging them to respect the National Socialist state and the Nazi movement in general.

 

Over the years, tens of thousands of inmates were released from the camps once they had shown that they had chosen to reform themselves. On many occasions the commandants of the camps had determined that inmates had abandoned their old ways and had chosen to become loyal members of German society. As late as October 1944, inmates were being released, and many of these were communists who had abandoned their previous beliefs.13

 

Of the persons sent to the concentration camps, many were sent there by court order for fixed terms. Other persons were arrested because of the danger they presented to German society. Some prisoners, who had been convicted during the Weimar era, were sent to the concentration camps after their release from prison. Since some of these prisoners were murderers, rapists and pedophiles, the National Socialist state refused to allow them to return to German society until the authorities were sure that they had abandoned their old ways. Contrary to modern political myth, German newspapers frequently carried stories on the concentration camps and often reported on the internment of dangerous persons.

 

Many of the camps were open to inspection by foreign diplomats and even by German civilians. Often the curious persons would travel to the camps only to be met by friendly guards and escorted through the camps on a personal tour. Of the tens of thousands of prisoners who were released, most probably told their relatives, friends and neighbors of the conditions present in the camps. Over the years, judges, lawyers, members of the clergy, social workers and repairmen were allowed into the camps for official business. Merchants often visited the camps to bring new stocks of supplies, and local civilians were often employed in the camps. If conditions in the camps had been deplorable, German society would have learned of it and would have been outraged. The Germans were and still are a decent people whose only crime in establishing the camps was showing leniency to persons who wanted to do them harm.

 

In a book written on the camp established at Oranienburg, Werner Schafer claimed that some citizens in the local communities asked permission to send some of their rebelling children to the camps to learn self-discipline. Schafer also said that there were some prisoners who were offered release who refused since they could not remember doing work since the beginning of the Great Depression.14 Schafer listed the types of food eaten by the prisoners and computed how much weight they had gained during their internment in the camp. Citizens of National Socialist Germany therefore had good reason to support the officials who administered the camps.

 

The nature of imprisonment in concentration camps can best be guessed by a document signed by Himmler, in which the principles of internment in a concentration camp were clarified. The document was not meant for public distribution and was classified "secret" before being sent to senior officers of the Gestapo on 27 May 1942. It reads:

Recently, various officials in the party and the government have begun threatening to lodge complaints with the police against citizens, or to have them imprisoned in concentration camps, in order to give greater force to various orders and decrees. In this manner, for instance, one officer threatened a citizen that he would be sent to a camp for "police interrogation" if he did not produce within five days a certain form, as he had been told to do by one of the officials. I request in all seriousness that the parties involved be instructed to cease this practice immediately, and if this is not done I will take upon myself to declare publicly that citizens are not liable in such instances to either police investigation or imprisonment in a concentration camp. The most severe punishments lose their deterrent ability when they are threatened at every opportunity, or when the impression is given that every official, in every office, is authorized to make use of it.

Imprisonment in a concentration camp, involving as it does separation from one's family, isolation from the outside world, and the hard labor assigned to the prisoner, is the most severe of punishments. Its use is reserved exclusively for the secret police, in accordance with precise regulations which specify the form of imprisonment and its term. In this matter I have retained for myself a large measure of authority and exclusive discretion. All in all the German people are uniquely fair-minded. Most Germans obey the instructions of the authorities of their own free will and desire. Instructions accompanied by threats will, however, be received with disrespect and will be obeyed only unwillingly, not to mention that the multiplication of threats of this type will give a completely false impression, both here and abroad.15


Not only does this document illuminate the fact that the concentration camp system was not vindictive or there to terrorize the civilian population, but it also shows that the leaders of the state had concern for the prisoners. Himmler recognized that imprisonment involved isolation and separation from loved ones and was determined to allow the German people to know that the only persons imprisoned in the camps were extreme cases. But more importantly, as the value of hindsight allows us to see, the document also allows us to understand where some of the Allied propaganda came from; minor officials were eager to add threats to their orders in an attempt to give the impression that they were more powerful than they actually were. Because of the actions of these minor officials, the Allies had the propaganda to claim that the concentration camps were there to terrorize the civilian population and to force them to become subservient to a state that only cared about itself. This was exactly what Himmler was afraid would happen: that the concentration camps would be seen to be a punitive punishment and not the center of re-education that they really were.

 

To meet the needs of re-education, the camp command in each camp was divided into several departments, which dealt with matters of administration, personnel, transport, communications, mail, equipment, kitchen work, supplies, health and sanitation and so forth. The camp commandants were assisted by a deputy, an adjutant, a master sergeant, a medical officer and education officer, a legal officer, a fire officer and others. The commandants were held personally responsible for the re-education of those prisoners who were not considered to be "lost cases." Because the camps were often open for public inspections, the commandants were also required to have some amount of political sensitivity. Starting in 1942, the commandants were also responsible for the work of the camp doctor and the medical staff.

 

The camp commandants had full responsibility for almost everything that happened in the camps, except for the work of the political departments. The political department operated in the camp as an extension of the Gestapo, and a plainclothes officer of the secret police headed it. This department dealt with the reception and registration of inmates, and was also in charge of their release. This department:

 

  • Kept files on each inmate that included personal details about the inmate, the inmate's picture and fingerprints
  • Was responsible for filing death notices and was responsible for passing this information on to government authorities
  • Corresponded with the relatives of the inmates in cases where there was a need for guardianship of underage children, insurance claims and so forth
  • Had the authority to decree special conditions of imprisonment
  • Was responsible for all interrogation that went on in the camps
  • Supervised prisoner informers, censorship, field security, and the prevention of rebellion 


    Not all members of the command had direct and daily contact with the inmates. The inmates were kept in a special compound within the camps, overseen by their own commanding officer and his staff. Some staff officers were responsible for head counts, others for work arrangements; others actually accompanied prisoners when they went out to work, while other officers were responsible for each of the living quarters, which were themselves referred to as a block. The personal deputy of the camp commandant usually oversaw the prisoner division of the camp.

     

    The camp commandants were also required to prevent cruelty to inmates. A training manual for camp guards asked the following question: "What is completely prohibited a camp guard? Answer: Under all circumstances he is forbidden to strike prisoners at his own initiative, outside the framework of the disciplinary regulations."

     

    In 1935 Reinhard Heydrich wrote to the camp guards stating that "it is not becoming an interrogator to insult a prisoner, demean him, or behave with rudeness and brutalize or torture him when there is no need to do so." Heydrich went on and warned the camp men that if they beat prisoners they would be court-martialed.16 Eicke himself wrote in 1937 that "the guards should be instructed to abstain from mistreating prisoners.... Even if a guard had done no more than slap a prisoner's face, the slap will be considered an act of brutality and the guard will be punished."17

     

    The SS actually punished a number of its own men for their conduct while serving in the concentration camps. Two concentration camp commandants, Adam Grünwald and Karl Chmielewshi, were placed on trial and found guilty of the deaths of prisoners as a result of brutality in their camps. The SS tried over 700 staff members throughout the course of the Third Reich for their conduct toward inmates. This was because the SS and the National Socialist state always considered concentration camps to be re-education camps first and foremost.

     

    It is true that persons who were considered to be hopeless cases such as habitual offenders were sent to the camps, but most prisoners always could earn their release by conforming to traditional Aryan-German standards of conduct. Unfortunately, many guards could not tell the difference between the habitual criminals and those who were there to be re-educated. This problem plagued the camp administration throughout the history of the Third Reich.

     

    Oswald Pohl complained that "As a result of my personal attention to the matter, and the repeated irregularities recently noted, I have learned that many of the guards at the camps are aware only in the faintest way of the obligations imposed upon them."18

     

    But historians must take into consideration the fact that tens of thousands of individuals served in the camps. If 700 committed crimes and were punished for it, it only highlights the fact that the other tens of thousands of Germans serving in the camps took their responsibilities seriously. Most camp men understood that their personal behavior was a way of encouraging inmates to aspire to be upstanding and proud citizens of Germany According to an SS booklet: "The prisoner must know that the guard represents a philosophy superior to his, an unblemished political approach and a higher moral level, and the prisoner must take these as a personal example as part of his efforts to correct himself so that he may once again be a loyal citizen in his community."19

     

    In April 1939, Adolf Hitler celebrated his 50th birthday. To celebrate this occasion, plans were drawn up for a pardon for several thousand prisoners in the camps. The instructions that determined who was to be freed and who would remain as an inmate reveal the different kinds of prisoners in the camps as well as revealing Hitler's generosity and good will. The intention of the pardon was to free inmates who were brought to the camps in 1933, six years before.

     

    It was determined to at least consider releasing repeat offenders who were arrested in the years 1933 to 1934 for short sentences and who had at least served a year in the camps; political and white-collar offenders who had been convicted on minor offenses and who had served at least six months; prisoners of 60 or more years of age, including Jehovah's Witnesses whose faith would not allow them to swear loyalty to the German state; first-time homosexuals who had not been convicted of sexual relations with minors; as well as prisoners who had in the past been members of the Nazi Party.20

     

    Then in 1941 the camps were classified into four groups, in accordance with the severity of the discipline and conditions of imprisonment imposed upon the inmates. Those prisoners who had been imprisoned for minor offenses and whom the SS considered to be possible to re-educate had the conditions of their imprisonment eased.

     

    The workdays in the camps were formalized in 1938. On weekdays, the inmates worked from 0730 to 1200 and from 1230 to 1700, for a total of nine hours a day. On Saturdays work was from 0730-1200, for a total of four and one-half hours. Not only were Saturday afternoons free, but Christian inmates had all of Sunday to attend their own services within the camp and to contemplate the reasons for their imprisonment.21

     

    Inside the camp, the barracks were segregated by sex, but in many cases prisoners were allowed to marry, even other prisoners. Registration in such cases was carried out by SS officers.22 The heirs of any prisoner who died while being held at one of the camps were eligible to collect their life insurance. Since the life insurance policies would expire if the premiums were not paid, and the inmates were incarcerated and without any substantial income, the SS came up with a solution that Establishment historians will not give them credit for. The SS set up its own fund to pay the insurance premiums of prisoners until the day they died.23 In this way, the loved ones of incarcerated inmates would not be overly burdened if their relative died while in custody.

     

    In 1936, the question was raised for the first time as to who would take care of the children when both parents were prisoners in concentration camps. Instead of taking the children away from their loving parents as is now done in countries such as the U.S. and Great Britain, the National Socialist authorities in Germany decided it would be better for the children if the parents were released on a rotating monthly basis so at least one parent would always be there to care for their needs. This rotating release continued until one of the parents was released for good.24

     

    Needless to say, this program did pose a slight security risk to Germany, but Hitler apparently was more concerned about the welfare of young German children than he was with anything else.

     

    Even though Allied war-time propaganda concerning the German concentration camps paints a bleak picture with ritual murder, rape, assault and other crimes, the facts of the period do not support this view.

     

    The efforts of the National Socialist authorities to rehabilitate and re-educate incarcerated criminals and communists show a dedication and a firm belief in their convictions that, in comparison, the United States and Great Britain are sorely lacking in their own prison administrations. Those Germans, tens of thousands of patriotic citizens, who served in the camps as doctors, nurses, cooks, clerks, bookkeepers, and guards, were much maligned and viciously attacked by Allied authorities in post-war Germany.

     

    Notes:

     

    1 See Pierre Hofstetter, Introduction to Paul Rassinier, Debunking the Genocide Myth: A Study of the Nazi Concentration Camps and the Alleged Extermination of European Jewry (Torrance, California, 1978)..

     

    2 Heiniz Hoehne, The Order of the Death's Head (New York, 1966)..

     

    3 Ibid

     

    4 Ibid...

     

    5 Max Domarus, Hitler Reden, v. 3 (Wiesbaden: R. Loweit, 1973)

     

    6 Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung

     

    7 Ibid

     

    8 "Nazi Prison Camps to be Permanent," The New York Times, July 27, 1933
     

    9 BAKO R 58/264 fol. 1309 u. 198a

     

    10 Ibid

     

    11 BAKO NS 19 320, May 29, 1942
     

    12 BAKO NS 3 426, July 27, 1943

     

    13 BAKO NS 3 vol. 401

     

    14 Schafer, Konzentrationslager Oranienburg


    15 BAKO R 58 1027 fol. 1-291

     

    16 BAKO R 58 264 fol. 309 u. 198a RSHA, January 8, 1935

    17 TV Befehlsblätter 1937, no. 5, p. 12, TV file,
    Berlin Document Center


    18 BAKO NS 3 442, November 7, 1944

    19 Aufgaben und Pflichten der Wachposten, July 27, 1943
    , BAKO NS 3 426

     

    20 BAKO R 58/1027 fold. 1-291

     

    21 Natzweiler Routine Orders, February 25, 1943, American Historical Association, Captured German Documents, Microfiled at the Berlin Document Center, 7. 75 R. 216 2/755081

    22 BAKO NS 3 Vol. 426, May 1943

    23 Weiterversicherung von Häftlingen, BAKO NS 3 405

    24 BAKO R 58 246 fol. 1 309 u. 198a. (RSHA), April 21, 1936

     



  • Political Religion and Slavery in the 20th Century


    Introduction

     

    In his sweeping comparison, Orlando Patterson has noted that, historically, slave systems are commonly based upon a sacred order. 1 I would like to argue that this is true of totalitarian regimes as well, and it is what makes totalitarian slavery unique among modern forms of bondage. This will strike many as patently absurd. Totalitarian regimes have been invariably secular. And yet they retain the most extreme, chiliastic impulses of the world’s historical religions. “Heaven” is transformed into secular “Thousand Year Reichs” or “Dictatorships of the Proletariat.” Recently, Michael Burleigh has attempted to place National Socialism in the context of 20th century extremism by defining it as a “political religion.” As he defines it, political religions are based on statolatry. Citizens worship in mass political rituals. Salvation is promised through faith in the regime and its leaders. Last, the regimes promise to deliver citizens to a promised land, a new historical destiny. Burleigh explicitly grounds his conception of political religions on theories of totalitarianism.

    As famously defined by Hannah Arendt, totalitarianism bases its rule neither on a political philosophy of human nature nor on any divine right. It bases its legitimacy instead on a historical mission to alter the stuff of human nature itself. It claims to set to work on nothing less than the metaphysical destiny of the world and refashion humanity itself in this name. In all cases, Burleigh notes, such regimes evoke a quasi-religious fervor. They displace the expectation of redemption in an afterlife into the present. They proclaim that a utopian political order can and will achieve that destiny in this world. 2

     

    When such regimes resort to slavery, they invariably do so by invoking a millenarian quest. In the process slavery is decoupled from any conventional pursuit of material gain. Its stated purpose becomes the transcendence of natural and human limitations through political order. The mere pursuit of profit could never account for such flights of metaphysical fundamentalism. True enough, outright greed is always present. The economic benefits of the Gulags or the Nazi concentration camps were also sometimes touted as national policy. In the Soviet Union prisoners were expected to produce between 30 to 50 percent more while receiving between 15 to 25 percent less pay than “free” laborers. Hitler’s slave lords expected similar gains. When concentration camp managers brought to Heinrich Himmler’s attention that prisoners did not work as efficiently as German civilians, he retorted, "It is simply normal and plain obvious that one can get double the amount [compared to civilians]."3 In each regime, reformers tried to rationalize these systems (Lavrenty Beria in the USSR and Oswald Pohl in Nazi Germany). The very expectation of untold productivity gains, in the end, serves as an example, not of rational economic calculation, but of how totalitarian regimes almost completely disregard the reality of modern production, as if it could simply be decreed. The rational calculation of productivity or efficiency—that is, standard engineering practice since the rise of modern management in the late 19th century—is always notably absent in totalitarian slave systems. Violent anti-capitalism, distrust of international standards of knowledge or best practice compound a glorification of “will” and essential community in order to preempt this. The attempts at reform proved woefully inadequate, even by these reformers’ own estimates and failed precisely because of resistance from within the slave system itself. Rather than straightforward, pragmatic exploitation, the slave systems of totalitarian regimes most often combined what historian Paul Josephson has called “totalitarian science and 3 technology” and what historian Loren Graham has called “Megaprojects.”

    “Megaprojects” may be defined as any large-scale undertaking in the name of industrial modernization that requires the vast transformation of a nation’s social fabric and the environment. These cost vast sums of money and involve labor forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands. They are not unique to totalitarian societies, and one could easily tot off examples of railroad building in the 19thcentury or interstate highway building in the 20th. 4 Still, totalitarian societies distinguish themselves in that a hypertrophically centralized state invariably pursues hypertrophically exaggerated ventures. 5 Josephson defines totalitarian science and technology by its centralized command and control. Loud proclamations in the name of the commonweal, community, culture, the worker, or the public good often mask the fact that central control overrides market forces, public opinion, civil rights, or whatever might check arbitrary waste, abuse, and tyranny. This is even more the case with slave systems, for precisely the most powerful organs of executive control—the secret police, the SS, the NKVD—act as slave lords. Precisely the weakest victims—the regimes most vulnerable enemies—provide the workers. Both Josesphson and Graham note that totalitarian megaprojects have a propensity to couple slave labor, technological utopianism, and an aesthetic of gigantism.

    The historian Karl Wittfogel once quipped that the great monuments executed by the compulsory labor of the ancients—the pyramids, the ziggurats—substitute a maximum of material for a minimum ofideas. 6 It might be too flippant to suggest that the unique addition made by totalitarian regimes to this mixture of slavery, gigantism, and lack of imagination was the vogue for mass production, electricity, and Taylorist time management new to the 20th century. Projects like the Dniepr damor the
    Magnitogorsk steel mills were publicized as the largest, most impressive in the world. 7

     

    Likewise the SS touted its factories as the grandest, most advanced of their kind. Their gigantism invariably announced: "centralized political power is the message!" 8 Most of them were abject disasters in direct proportion to their complete divorce from any rational estimate of their practical value. This is not to say that economy, science, and technology under totalitarian regimes proved universally incompetent. Although this view was very prevalent in the immediate post-war period and still enjoys a certain popularity, enough excellent scholarship has demonstrated the very opposite. But totalitarian slave projects almost invariably succumbed to abject incompetence and failure precisely because megaprojects had become acts of devotion in the political religion of their regimes. There can be no doubt that a sacralization of machines accompanied them. Slaves most often found themselves working on what might be called messianic technocracies, reaching out for the total transformation of the world.  9 "Electricity will replace god,” Lenin once stated, “The peasants should pray to it; in any case they will feel its effects long before they feel any effect from on high." 10 Michael Burleigh comments that in the study of National Socialism, “emphasis on bastardised science has begun to distract from the role of bastardised religiosity." 11 But these are not mutually exclusive. The megaprojects of National Socialism allowed Hitler to be both priest and engineer of the German spirit. One canonical survey of the monumental architecture of the Nazi regime compares the dilapidation of “other races which remain nomads even in the most fertile territory” to “the buildings of the new Reich, that place the highest demands on both the engineer and the architect, and make clearly felt that the German people has risen up as the master of technology and subordinated its possibilities to the German will." 12

     

    Influential “post-modern” interpretations notwithstanding, political religions have proven relatively immune to rational calculation or “technocratic” reason. Recourse to grandiose Four and Five-Year Plans proliferate everywhere, but if Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union were “seeing like a state,” they did so through cataracts. 13 Economic rationale, planning, or technological calculation cannot account for what is uniquely perverse in the slavery of the 20th century. The only thing that can is the chiliastic political religions of totalitarian states. I will here ground the case of slavery under National Socialism, the case I know best, in a comparative perspective in an attempt to illustrate the unique nature of this practice. Hitler’s Labor Lords National Socialism gave rise to many forms of compulsory labor, but I will focus here on the most extreme and deadly, slave labor in the concentration camps. It has been common to locate the uniqueness of the camps in their supposed total “system” of control. As a result, emphasis has tended to fall more on the form rather than the substance of slave labor in the concentration camps. The camps themselves are often presented as institutions of absolute power, even hermetically sealed, as if they developed according to an intrinsic logic of terror.14T his does seem to capture a prevalent viewpoint among victims, to whom the camps often seemed to serve no other purpose than torment. Yet their institutional history suggests potent influences other than an insane logic of absolute power “grounded upon itself.” 15

    Totalitarian regimes do not so much invent novel methods for the pursuit of power. Rather they distinguish themselves through an almost hallucinatory preoccupation with what I will call ontological enemies. Ontological enemies are defined by their being rather than by any real actions, opposition, or even thought or opinions. Nazi activists presumed the very existence of the “Jew” or any other “unnecessary eater” to create a state of civil war or, at the very least, to weaken
    Germany intolerably. If the concentration camps continued to evolve as a “system” of state power, they did so only because they began to incorporate a totalitarian preoccupation with the historical transformation of the citizen and the state, including a preoccupation with ontological enemies, enemies by virtue of nothing else than their being.

    In the first months of Nazi rule, Hitler’s regime did what all dictatorships do. It quickly suppressed its political opposition, especially but not exclusively communists and socialists. Some were murdered. Many more were incarcerated in ad hoc detention centers that evolved into the concentration camp system. The camps originally served nothing more than a successful dictatorial seizure of power. This was bloody but scarcely unusual; and in comparison with, say, the arbitrary murder unleashed by Suharto or Augusto Pinochet, the Nazis did not distinguish themselves. At the end of 1935, the Justice Ministry even considered eliminating the camps because they had served their purpose.16 Only with the innovation of new foundational principles did the camps evolve into the system of terror synonymous with Nazi rule. The concentration camps, as Heinrich Himmler argued, must vigilantly protect what Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann have called the “racial state.” 17 In a context that conflated biology, culture, and politics, deviance of any kind could be taken as evidence of transgression against the “race.” Thus, after 1935, the Gestapo began to arrest predominantly German men for new reasons.

    Totalitarian slavery always starts at home and cleansing the body politic began with members of the preferred racial group. 18 Jews were not specifically targeted at this time, though they were vastly overrepresented in the camps and singled out for the harshest treatment. But the National Socialist state was always very ecumenical in the pursuit of its mission. The camps expanded to receive an influx of “professional criminals,” “habitual criminals,” and “asocials,” all loosely defined not so much by actual misdeeds as by a speciously defined “nature.” Himmler, the Reichsführer SS and ultimate head of the concentration camps, argued repeatedly that vigilance against internal enemies was necessary for national defense.19 The SS was remarkably consistent in this regard. Near the end of the war, the special office responsible for managing labor allocations to war industries issued a question-and-answer drill to train guards. This was to be memorized and performed by those who managed labor details: Q: Why are prisoners dangerous? A: Because they can destroy the unity of our nation, lame our power, threaten our victory. They threaten to make it possible for those at home to stab the soldiers at the front in the back, just as they did before [i.e. as Jews, socialists, and communists had supposedly done in World War I]. 20 The manual went on to define prisoners, not only as enemies of the state, but as deviants, freeloaders, traitors who had maliciously withheld their contribution in a time of total war. As ontological enemies, the SS considered their very existence to threaten civil war. As this quasi ritual of labor management only suggests, racial-biological definitions of citizenship were also inherently economic, but in ways that deviated markedly from liberal political economy. Individuals were judged in terms their use-value to the “national community.”

    The SS, along with German economic planners, considered its enemies a threat to production by virtue of their mere existence. Slave labor began when the SS took upon itself the task of forcing its enemies, whose very being posed a threat, into the service of higher purposes. From 1936 to 1939, SS industries set out to lay hands upon “fallow work power” (brachliegende Arbeitskräfte) and drive prisoners to “communal” service. 21 “Fallow” was relatively moderate in Nazi vocabulary politics, but it captures the ethos expressed in much more radical terms like “unnecessary eater” or “lives unworthy of living.” As the SS liaison to the Office of the Four Year Plan stated:

    … national labor discipline dictated that all persons who would not conform to the working life of the nation, and who were vegetating as work-shy and asocial, making the streets of our cities and countryside unsafe, had to be compulsorily registered and set to work. 22

    Those who managed the burgeoning industrial empire of the SS were more enthusiastic:

    Companies of the Schutzstaffel are operated in order to fulfill the task of the Reichsführer SS to bring prisoners in the [concentration] camps once more to work that is worthy of men. 23

     

    These statements express, not so much concern with the exploitation of labor power, as a preoccupation with danger and a desire to refashion “worthy” men. Hitler’s slave labor lords emphasized communal goals, historic mission, and cultural crusades. The chief executive of SS corporations emphasized, “The SS pursues its enterprise exclusively to fulfill discrete tasks that are completely cultural and communal in nature. The SS fundamentally avoids business endeavor for the sole purpose of earning money. ... [This] leads our companies down certain paths that a purely private businessman would never dare, and this causes losses from time to time.” 24 Discussion of economic rationale, concrete calculations of labor power, efficiency, productivity—one searches in vain for any of this. This is undoubtedly because slavery has commonly been about identity politics. As Orlando Patterson has pointed out, the economic relations of slavery, so important for theorists like Marx and so typical of American slavery, are not necessarily primary in the long history of slavery. As slaves, individuals exist in a permanent state of dishonor. As such, their debasement elevates the honor of the master. Most important for my purposes here, masters have historically impressed slaves into bondage less out of any concrete economic need than as an exaltation of their status, an expression of their identity as masters. 25 Totalitarianism has distinguished itself by combining this older, more traditional identity politics with the industrial revolution and the most radical politics of the nation state.

     

    Nazi Germany’s primary motive for enslaving its own citizens grew out of preoccupation with ontological enemies as well as the desire among activists to project their own worthiness. There can be little doubt that this took on sacred overtones. According to one party journal:

    … the National Socialist Menschenführer [leader of men] should uncover and expose unhealthy ideological developments ... these tasks have certain similarities with the profession of the clergy..." 26 The SS founded its own corporations in this spirit. This effort was as much about the identity of National Socialists as about their enemies. The case of the Jews is interesting in this regard. However important to Hitler and other Nazi activists, anti-Semitism played no significant role in garnering widespread public support among “ordinary Germans.” Jews comprised less than one percent of the German population, and—unlike communists or socialists who, after all, maintained paramilitary formations—the persecution of the Jews served no obvious pragmatic end. Yet attacks upon them did cement a sense of omnipotence among true believers in the regime. Historian Richard Bessel notes, it “appears to have satisfied emotional urges, the desire to humiliate and harm people who were alleged to have enormous power and influence but in fact were largely defenseless… 27

    Victims, in general, repeatedly became objects upon which to perform one’s devotion in the regime’s political religion.

    In his biography of Theodor Eicke, the SS man responsible for the geometric expansion of the concentration camp in the 1930s, Tom Segev, remarks that Eicke "wanted his men to know why they were serving … and he often overlooked willful mistreatment of the prisoners as long as he was convinced that the misconduct was the result of an inner identification with the tasks of the concentration camps." 28 On the opposite side of this coin, Eicke’s camps tailored forced labor to the perceived nature of their ontological enemies. The camps did not organize work details rationally on the basis of skills or professional abilities. Rather punishment was supposed to fit the crime, and the crime had less to do with actions than with the inmate’s race, politics, or “nature,” however defined. Eicke’s service regulations specifically reserved the hardest labor for the most unforgivable political or racial enemies (communists or Jews, for instance). Eicke showed little interest in the exploitation of skill; in fact, he told Kommandanten not to heed professional criteria: “Prisoners, without exception, are obligated to carry out physical labor. Status, profession, and background will not be taken into account.” 29

     

    Slave labor was originally a means to impose the might of National Socialism upon inmates. One official of the Reich Ministry of Justice formulated this quite bluntly: “One of the most valuable tools for securing the safe incarceration of the criminal is [to make him] work all day long, from morning to night, every week, month, and year of his imprisonment. This leaves him no time for stupid thoughts [dumme Gedanken] and, as an added bonus, helps to raise discipline within the institution.” 30 To the SS men who supervised the inner camp grounds, slave labor also provided a daily practice in which they could prove their “will” in the face of ontological enemies. “We will pick you up by the scruff of your necks and bring you to silence after our own recipe!" Eicke declared. 31

     “Under the Pharaohs”: Slavery and Monumental Building in Nazi Germany

    If slave labor lent a daily routine for a kind of identity politics in the camps, it served a grander purpose at the level of national policymaking. The SS drove its prisoners in carefully selected projects that directly served the regimes political religion. The SS founded slave-labor corporations in a sector that was neglected precisely because it lay outside the massive rearmament drive begun in 1935/1936. This was the building-supply industry, supposed to serve the architectural monuments of Hitler’s regime.

     

    Albert Speer, Hitler’s favorite architect, was the SS’s strongest ally. Since 1934 he had been preparing massive edifices like the Reich Chancellery, the Nürnberg Party Rally Grounds, and the German Stadium. 32 Collectively, these were known as the “Führer Buildings.” Albert’s brother Hermann Speer remarked that his “little brother” had gotten involved in “that stupid anti-Semitism” during this work. Albert had cleared Jewish apartments blocks around Berlin’s Potsdamer Platz in preparation for the Führer Buildings, and Hermann recalled that he let drop: “After all, the Jews were already making bricks under the Pharaohs.” He supposedly suggested to Heinrich Himmler that prisoners might as well be put to work in the same way. 33 Germany’s re-armament drive created a pressing labor shortage. Speer was placing huge orders for bricks, dressed granite, marble, and limestone. These were precisely the kind of raw materials that required labor-intensive production. Both Speer and Himmler sensed that they could use each other to mutual benefit. 34

     

    The Führer Buildings and others not only monumentalized the regime to its citizens and the rest of the world; they were also the intended sites of the regime’s political rituals. They are the edifices that appear so prominently in Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will. The architecture of the  theatre designed by Wernner Marsch for the Olympic complex in Berlin consciously amalgamates classicism, religious ritual, and mass political demonstration. The collective spectacle subsumes the individual. Any particularity is blurred and flattened in the crowd, while the stage glows luminescent. The amphitheatre evokes the rite of ancient theatre, in which civic devotion, entertainment, and worship are indistinguishable. 35 The concentration camps set their prisoners to work on “Führer Buildings” of much grander proportions than this.

     

    From the summer of 1936 to the outbreak of war the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps founded no less than five new camps: Sachsenhasuen (1936), Buchenwald (1937), Flossenbürg (1938), Mauthausen (1939), and Ravensbrück (1939)—all in conjunction with prison industries. Others, like Neuengamme, Natzweiler, and Gross-Rosen, later grew out of industrial satellite camps established next to quarries or clay pits. Albert Speer’s office, the city of Hamburg, and the German Workers Front all placed advanced orders or extended credit to the SS in these endeavors. The SS founded Natzweiler near rare red granite quarries in order to supply stone desired by Albert Speer for his monumental German Stadium building. The quarries were chosen despite the fact that they were known to be unprofitable and abandoned by private business. The stadium was to hold over 400,000 visitors and thus be the “largest in the world.”

     

    The SS’s factories displayed all the hallmarks of totalitarian science and technology in their gigantism and technological dilettantism. For example, the SS set out to make brickworks at Sachsenhausen the largest in the world. Technological dandyism quickly manifested itself. The German Earth and Stone Works invested in a newly invented brick press. Albert Speer wrote after the war that “someone turned up with a new system for manufacturing brick” and this nifty machine was the selling point. 36 SS business executives themselves testified after the war, “The Reichsführer SS Himmler and, following his example, Pohl supported all inventors on principle.” 37 Management never bothered to assess the clay deposits near the camp. These proved unsuitable for the machine. In another case, fuel generators were so faulty they threatened to explode. 38

    By 1944, Himmler's high-tech mesmerization would fuel SS interest in the so-called miracle weapons, the V-1 cruise missile and V-2 rocket. But even these, the most successful of the SS’s ventures, provide further examples of the waste and irrationality of totalitarian science and technology. The V-2 rocket project, to this day the object of admiration among war buffs and technology enthusiasts, inflicted, in Michael Neufeld’s estimation, fewer losses on the enemy in combat than it cost the slave labor force of the
    Harz Mountains where it was assembled. 39

     

    In a consistent pattern, the SS seems to have been driven by a desire to capture the essence of futurism through technology. Historian Modris Eksteins has argued that new technology "was a means of escaping from the confines of reality, a way of liberating the imagination." 40 The SS posed as the vanguard of National Socialism. Repeatedly striving to associate itself with futuristic technology, the SS sought to demonstrate the will and acquire the means to transform German society, to usher it into the future. What better way than by championing technologies that seemed “cutting edge” or promised, however vaguely, to embody change and progress? In any case, calculated estimates of how the SS could exploit slave labor rationally are consistently absent from SS records. And since the justification was always “cultural,” mismanagement seldom deterred further expansion. One might expect wartime to have reigned in these impulses, but, quite to the contrary, the war drove Himmler onward to more grandiose fantasies than the Führer Buildings, slavery quickly became even more intimately fused to the identity politics of Hitler’s “racial state.” In like measure, it also became more deadly. By the fall of 1941, the chief executive of all SS corporate enterprise, Oswald Pohl, announced the “final organizational form” of a new holding company for the management of slave labor. He stressed the “fulfillment of tasks that fall to the Reichsführer SS as the Chief of German Police, such as the concentration camp industries,” including “tasks ordered by the Reichskommissar for the Reinforcement of Germandom.” 41 (Notably absent in Pohl’s announcement was any pragmatic concern with armaments production or the war economy).

    The Reichskommissar for the Reinforcement of Germandom (RKF), a grandiloquent title that fell to Himmler on 7 October 1939, marked a new departure. Immediately after the conquest of
    Poland, the Nazi state began to plan a vast ring of Aryan settlements in the conquered territory. These would “surround” (einkesseln) native Polish and Jewish populations in order to “gradually crush them to death economically and biologically.” 42 In short, the new duties of the RKF constituted a historical mission far more vast than that offered by the Führer Buildings of only a few years before. Heinrich Himmler announced in the summer of 1942: “The war will have no meaning when, 20 years hence, we have not undertaken a totally German settlement of the occupied territories ... If we do not provide the bricks here, if we do not fill our camps full with slaves--in this room I say the thing very clearly and unambiguously--with work slaves, who, without regard to whatever loss, [are to] build our cities, our towns, our farmsteads, we will not have the money after the long years of war in order to furnish the settlements in such a fashion that truly German men can live in them and can take root in the first generation. 43 Himmler demanded the immediate expansion of all SS corporations to meet a minimum of 80% of the SS’s settlement construction needs: "If we do not," Himmler warned, "we will never … get houses for our SS men in the Reich, nor will I, as Reichskommissar for the Reinforcement of Germandom, be able to erect the homes that we will need in order to make the East German." 44

     

    Pohl sought to expand the SS industrial empire until the end of the war in the name of this racial-supremacist utopia. Slave labor expanded geometrically. There can be no doubt that this was a “megaproject,” in Loren Graham’s terms. The scale is dumbfounding, especially when one considers that the German economy was in the midst of a painful transition to total war. A newly organized SS engineering corps started to establish labor brigades with over 160,000 fresh prisoners: “POW's, Jews, and otherwise incarcerated foreigners, etc.,” as Hans Kammler, the SS’s chief of engineers put it indiscriminately. 45 Kammler projected a schedule of 20-30 billion Reichsmark,  Himmler's own handwritten notes chided his needless parsimony. 80 to 120 billion, Himmler penciled in the margin, would be more appropriate! 46 By comparison, Germany’s total industrial investment in 1942 was only 5.9 billion, a figure only surpassed in 1953. Even in 1955, total industrial investment was no larger than 9.3 billion. 47

     

    In early 1942 Himmler notified the Inspector of Concentration Camps, “In the coming days I will send … 100,000 Jews and up to 50,000 Jewesses. In the next few weeks the concentration camps will be assigned great industrial tasks. SS Major General Pohl will inform you of the details.” 48 This was roughly the number of laborers that Pohl and his engineer, Kammler, had called for in their projected SS slave-labor brigades for the construction of Aryan settlements. In its most megalomaniac dimensions, Himmler’s visions of racial imperialism became known as the New Order, its scope limited only by the advance of German arms. This was a megaproject of the first magnitude. The New Order proposed to remake all of occupied central and Eastern Europe, and the SS intended its slave industries to manufacture and build it. The most infamous concentration camps were founded with this project in mind.

    In 1940-1941, the SS founded Majdanek near
    Lublin, Auschwitz in Upper Silesia, and Stutthof near Danzig. From the beginning, these camps integrated slave labor with regional settlement plans. Stutthof alone, the smallest of the three camps, foresaw space for 25,000 prisoners. This alone would have doubled the previous captive labor force of the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps, “with which we can then complete the build-up of settlements in the Gau Danzig-West Prussia,” as Himmler put it. 49

     

    As with many megaprojects, something unreal clung to these plans. The feverish pace of Pohl and Himmler’s designs was, ironically, matched only by the rapidity with which Germany’s prospects in war began their decline. As already mentioned, the SS laid out its “New Order” amidst a general transition to total war, and eventually war mobilization could not help but redirect the SS’s industrial empire to the more pragmatic demands of armament production. Nevertheless, the SS simply diverted its slave labor pool to new megaprojects that arose in the total war economy. In late 1941, the Inspector of Concentration Camps had remained separate from Pohl’s offices. After March 3rd, 1942, however, Himmler himself ordered Pohl to take over the concentration camps and convert them into a slave labor preserve for the German war effort. Pohl became the counterpart to Lavrenty Beria in the USSR. Both were appointed to orient slave labor toward national defense. Pohl greeted this new initiative with enthusiasm: "… the fetters of discoordinated administration must be shed … and will be hailed everywhere as progress." 50 Yet pragmatism did not carry the day. If the racial supremacist utopia of the “New Order” had to be postponed, it nevertheless continued to preoccupy the minds of SS slave labor managers.

     

    Like many other enterprises, SS corporations struggled to find war contracts to prevent the armaments ministry from shutting down their factories and transferring their capital equipment to more vital sectors. In doing so, the SS sought to preserve its capacity in order to reconvert to a “normal” peace economy after total war ended. The SS still wished to return to its settlement fantasies, and even referred to these as the “peace building program” or “peace buildings” (Friedensbauten). In the summer of 1943, the chief of SS engineers wrote to Himmler about the “gigantic program after the conclusion of war.“ The SS had to secure ”the preconditions for a quick victory“ in order, simultaneously, to advance “in this way the facilities of the Waffen-SS for Peace Work [Friedensarbeit].“ 51 Pohl’s office negotiated steadily with the armaments ministry in the fall of 1942 over allocations of prisoners to armaments factories, but only half of the SS’s negotiations dealt with war production. The other half dealt with ongoing efforts to build up the SS’s vertically integrated construction combine. Pohl’s effusiveness on this topic far overreached any excitement over participation in armaments factories. “We are ready!” he wrote to Himmler, “I have discussed the organization of Building Brigades [with Speer’s office] ... In our Building Brigades I see the beginnings of our later Peace Building Brigades that will develop and build. It will Work!” 52

     

    The German Earth and Stone Works would supply roofing tiles and bricks for bomb-damaged cities; the German Equipment Works, another SS company, would provide window and door frames. In this way the SS could contribute to the war effort in the short term while building up the capacity to embark upon settlement construction after “final victory.” Private industry and Speer’s ministry alike came to rely upon the SS as slave labor lord. The chief SS manager of labor allocations, Gerhard Maurer, received glowing praise. “It has been reported to me that we owe the smooth operation of this action [the SS Labor Action] essentially to your competence and cooperation,” wrote the head of German aircraft production in the spring of 1943. 53

     

    Hans Kammler, chief of SS engineers, also put the Building Brigades of the SS to work building underground armaments factories, among them the tunnels in the Harz mountains where the V-2 rockets were manufactured. These efforts took off in 1943 after bombing raids prompted Hitler to demand gigantic, modern production lines within invulnerable underground factories. These were christened the "Great Building Projects" (Großbauvorhaben). Each was supposed to provide 600,000 square meters. This again demonstrated a great deal of continuity with the SS’s previous megaprojects. Hitler’s architectural policies had progressed from one gargantuan, unrealistic program to the next. In the 1930's it had been the Führer Buildings. In 1939 the Reichskommissar for the Reinforcement of Germandom had dreamed spending in the range of 50-80 percent of Germany’s gross domestic product on Aryan settlement construction. Now the “impregnable” Great Buildings took on apocalyptic proportions as the Führer’s last architectural fantasy. 54 There can be no doubt that these were megaprojects. Hermann Göring’s Luftw affe alone demanded over 100,000 slaves, “in order to secure the development of self-contained air-craft fabrication of the most modern kind.”55

    As already noted, even the most successful, the V-2 rockets, must, in the end, count as an egregious misallocation of resources. Each consumed up to six times the resources to build as more practical military hardware like fighter planes. The missiles delivered only 1000 kg of explosives and were not as accurate as the SCUD missiles deployed by Iraq in the first Gulf War.56The V-2 was much feared—not least because of the futuristic nature of the technology. This had drawn the SS to the “miracle” project in the first place. But the missile had no strategic value. 57 A disconnect from reality adhered to many more mundane aspects of these projects as well. The underground factory halls Hitler called for to produce the V-2 rocket and other “miracle” weapons required, as originally projected, more cement than existed in the entire German building economy. 58 In the end, however, the Great Buildings were one more experiment in the abject irrationality toward which totalitarian regimes so consistently incline.

     

    Fascist architecture in Germany


    Slave Labor and Genocide

    I would like to conclude with the example of Auschwitz. Here the SS set slave labor to work on the most gruesome megaproject of the regime, the Holocaust itself. Unique to Auschwitz the methods of genocide were technology-intensive and designed as a modern factory, and operated with slave labor. At other death camps, Jews were forced to aid their murderers, but these other camps were ad hoc and improvised. They might be considered precedents for Auschwitz’s killing factory, but they were not designed by professional engineers. Only Auschwitz combined all the hallmarks of totalitarian science and technology in a “megaproject” of ethnic cleansing. I will attempt to show that it synthesized all the attributes of totalitarian slavery I have sought to illustrate here.

    Birkenauu, where the gas chambers and crematoria of
    Auschwitz were located, owed its existence to the most cherished megaproject of the Third Reich. Himmler had ordered the expansion camp of Birkenau in September of 1941 as a labor depot for the SS’s projected slave brigades for the New Order. First projected to 50,000 , then 100,000, 125,000, and finally 150,000 prisoners, Birkenau was expected to be the labor pool for Aryan settlement construction in the east. All told, fantasies of demographic engineering called for upwards of 850,000 slave laborers over 25 years. 59 Simultaneously and intimately connected to this megaproject. the Auschwitz complex quickly evolved into a center for extermination. No later than October of 1941, RKF planners, SS Einsatzgruppen, and other SS elites had merged the megaproject of Aryan settlement with an equally massive, labor-intensive project of ethnic cleansing. The crematoria and gas chambers of Birkenau were only one part of a larger design to dispense with the populations of Europe in a grand demographic shell game. Interdisciplinary teams of sociologists, historians, geographers, architects, and policemen worked together to remove unwanted populations from the East to prepare the way for German settlement.

    Jews were by no means the only targets of this social engineering, but they were pursued the most ruthlessly. They were also, not coincidentally, the victims with the fewest resources to defend themselves. Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Reich Security Main Office, offered one of the most frank statements that syncretized slave labor and genocide in the well-known Wannsee protocol of early 1942: … in the course of the final solution, the Jews will enter the Labor Action in a suitable way in the East. In large work gangs, separated by sex, Jews capable of work will build roads. During this work, a large number will doubtless perish due to natural cause. The possible final remnant will doubtless represent a natural selection and be that part most capable of resistance. It will have to be handled accordingly, for if these were to beset free, they would act as the seed of a new Jewish revival (see the experience of history.. 60

    The fusion of genocide and dreams of Aryan settlement are evident throughout the occupied East. For example, the three death camps founded in the Lublin District known as Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka all originated under the leadership of the SS and Police Leader Odilo Globocnik. Himmler had also bestowed upon him special responsibility for organizing the first SS settlements of the New Order in this same district. The close relationship between the New Order and ethnic cleansing can also be seen in Globocnik staff. In August, 1941 he divided the functions of his office into five main departments. Three dealt directly with some aspect of the New Order, the settlement of “ethnic Germans” and the planning of SS model villages. Globocnik charged one officer in particular, Obersturmführer Gustav Hanelt, with the “overall scientific planning of the SS and Police Strongholds and the cleansing of the Jews[Judenbereinigung].” 61 The SS experienced this as a historical mission of the first order. At a conference convened by Hanelt’s “scientific” institute in the SS Community Building in Lublin, Globocnik’s immediate superior declared it “the overall greatest task that the German people has to master for all future times in order to become a world power.” 62

     

    The SS also dedicated special attention to the aesthetic, design of settlements and community buildings and one architect of the Oswald Pohl’s engineering corps gave a presentation on “Questions of German Building Design in the East.” 63 Thus Lublin had become the focus of a dense network of individuals planning both the murder of Jews in the East and the utopian expansion of “German blood” to fill the void. By mid-March of 1942, as the killing systems of Belzec were being tested, Hanelt declared the “Jewish Question” to have “found its conclusion.” 64 Historian Götz Aly and political scientist Susanne Heim have demonstrated similar networks throughout German occupied Europe. These combined genocidaires and demographic engineers. In some districts of the occupied eastern territories, Aly has been able show that deportations of Jews and Poles correlate directly with the scheduled in-migration of “ethnic Germans,” whom the SS was moving west from the territories of the Soviet Union. 65

     

    Auschwitz was another such hub of settlement and genocide. The region around it quickly evolved into a chosen location for model communities. Historian Sybille Steinbachernotes in Auschwitz, like Lublin, “The highpoint of mass murder, it is evident, was at the same time the high point of hypertrophic ‘Germanization’ activity in Auschwitz.”66Only at Auschwitz, however, did the SS amalgamate its demographic megaproject with totalitarian science and technology in the act of genocide itself. Other killing camps of the east were decidedly ad hoc. Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka, for example, were built of locally scavenged materials. Even at Auschwitz, the sordid business of industrial killing began more as the work of improvisers than modern industrial management.

     

    In the spring and summer of 1942, the staff of the Political Department converted two small farmhouses, in the Birch woods behind Birkenau. A detail of prisoner masons bricked up the windows; paper tape sufficed to make the doors air tight. The first gassings at Auschwitz in September of 1941 had been even more of a slap dash affair. Höss’s adjutant Karl Fritsch threw some gas into the basement of Block 11 in the main camp in order to kill several hundred Soviet prisoners of war who had been forced into the various rooms that the SS Political Department used as cells there. 67 It is important to note, however, that the results were devastating. Rudimentary methods sufficed to kill hundreds of thousands of people. The massive gas chambers of Birkenau differed markedly from their inception. Here the SS indulged a penchant for what Paul Josephson calls “display value” in the very buildings Jewish slaves were forced to murder their brethren. Architectural historians Paul Jaskot and Robert Jan van Pelt have demonstrated the concentration camps’ investment in monumental features. 68 It is little known that the SS also imparted architectural flourishes to the Birkenau crematoria as well. One blueprint records that the doors and windows were to be “lined with sandstone!” 69 The drafter was exited enough to include the exclamation point in the original. The Jewish pathologist Miklos Nyiszli, forced to work in Crematoria II, also described the lavish “modern” autopsy rooms of Birkenau’s crematoria: “… in the center … stood a dissecting table of polished marble, equipped with several drainage channels. At the edge of the table a basin with nickel taps had been installed; against the wall, three porcelain sinks.” 70 If one considers that the crematoria and gas chambers were built of massive brick and stone masonry, it is hard to escape the impression that the SS lavished some of the attention upon them otherwise reserved for Führer Buildings. Their cost and complexity distinguished them from all others. They were not merely functional buildings. They were monuments to a fetishism for modern factory technology, its futurism.

     

    The unique, technology-intensive means of genocide at Auschwitz-Birkenau have preoccupied the post-war imagination ever since, namely that of our nightmares. Auschwitz has come to embody, for some, those dreams of Western rationality that inevitably beget monsters. But a ghoulish preoccupation with the “factory of death” at Auschwitz has actually obscured the fact that these crematoria never actually worked as the SS intended. It is also little known that the SS’s ad hoc systems, not the crematoria of Birkenau, proved cheaper, more durable, and, in this macabre sense, more “efficient.” Although the engineers of Auschwitz readied the first blueprints for the crematoria in October and Novermber of 1941, construction did not start until June of 1942. Shortages delayed their completion well into March of 1943. Even then, the crematoria broke down within months of their first operation. The chimney flues caved in. By the winter of 1942/1943, the SS had was forced to go over to burning bodies in open pyres rather than in the massive banks of furnaces laid out like industrial kilns in Birkenau’s crematoria. If Auschwitz’s Political Department seems to have resorted to ad hoc methods out of impatience, it had no problem quickly generating techniques that worked with devastating effectiveness. Had “function” taken precedence over the aesthetics of “form” in the genocide, the SS would have had no need for the crematoria of Birkenau to their completion. The SS did never require the over-engineered and costly, factory-style gas chambers and crematoria of Birkenau. They desired them, and that is what brooks explanation. There is every indication that the SS celebrated its novel invention and that this enthusiasm was by no means confined to the circle of the technicians or engineers who developed it. Something close to an exuberance for the modern technics of genocide seems to have surrounded the crematoria of Birkenau.

     

    One survivor of the SS architectural bureaus spoke of the “feverish work to find a technical solution to the application of poison gas for mass murder.” 71 Another recalled an SS man describing the complex of Birkenau as "The most modern one that can be built in Europe." 72 The SS led tours of the facilities and visitors timed the process with stop watches. Visitors fetishized what one called, “The most modern measures which make possible the completion of the Führer’s orders here [Birkenau] in the shortest time and without a great stir.” 73 Typical of totalitarian science and technology, the SS sought to distinguish the ‘modernity’ of its technology, its service to higher causes (“the Führer’s orders”), and its unprecedented size.

     

    In 1933, there were only 152 crematoria ovens in all of Germany, although professional literature was touting this method as “modern equipment” for “new cemeteries.” 74 The Auschwitz complex had no less than 49. In the “Greater German Reich,” which included Austria and the Sudentenland of Czechoslovakia, there were about 80,000 cremations carried out during the whole of 1939. One SS engineer calculated the capacity of Birkenau’s crematoria as nearly 5,000 in a single day. One other aspect of Birkenau makes it a singular example of totalitarian slavery, science, and technology. The SS forced slaves to run the crematoria and gas chambers. Jews were forced to serve as the blue-collar workers of the Holocaust. This work had as much to do with the humiliation of the Jewish victims—and, simultaneously, the assertion of mastery and power among their SS slave drivers—as it ever did with “bureaucratic efficiency” and the like. This is at odds with interpretations of the Holocaust that have enjoyed wide popularity ever since the end of the war, interpretations elaborated in Hannah Arendt’s biography of the dismal Adolf Eichmann or Stanley Milgram’s social psychology experiments.

     

    Historians and social scientists have been preoccupied with how industrial-bureaucratic systems can induce “ordinary men” to override their scruples and commit murder. Many have assumed that the techniques of murder at Auschwitz actually served this purpose: to distance killers from their crime, to override a supposed revulsion for their crime. But our preoccupation with the mentality of the killers has caused us to loose sight of the truly unwilling executioners: the slave laborers themselves, forced to work in the Special Details (Sonderkommandos) of the crematoria. Orlando Patterson defines dishonor and dehumanization as the essence of all slave systems, there can be little doubt that the Special Details experience this in one of its most extreme form. The Nazi regime put its ontological enemies to work on the transformation of Europe into a racial utopia. The substance of their labor was not just murder; it was the extirpation of the very existence of their people.

     

    We know relatively little about the Auschwitz’s Special Details, numbering between 400-1200 men at any given time, because most of them perished. Their labor was divided according to task and managed by prisoner-foremen (Kapos, in the slang of the camps) who answered in turn to non-commissioned SS officers. Accounts of the Special Details vary, but some few did survive to write memoirs or testified in post-war trials. Many other survivors knew those who worked in the Special Details. Still more observed them from afar. By all accounts this work was so excruciatingly humiliating and dehumanizing that many became so dejected and depressed that they died shortly after the SS selected them for the Special Details. Many also refused to work and were killed directly. One Greek Jew who survived the Special Details stated frankly that he could not take the work. “I used to have to close my eyes and pull the people out [of the gas chamber].” He also remembered that some simply gave up the will to live. 75 One survivor concealed his experience after liberation, something that suggests that the humiliation continued long after the war was over, “I was ashamed. People thought we helped the killing, calling us murderers…” 76

     

    This acute shame was constantly with them, and another survivor recalled being most ashamed when he realized how inured he had become to the work: “We would eat near the bodies. I don't understand today how I ate near the bodies. I didn’t feel anything ... Why didn't God help?” 77 Members of the Special Details often came across the bodies of their acquaintances, friends, and family among the dead. They themselves lived under the constant threat of liquidation, which happened on a regular basis. 78 Salmen Lowenthal, who did not survive, buried his notebooks in the hopes that they would bring the true nature of Auschwitz to light after his death. This voice from beyond the grave, from a time when industrialized murder went on day after day, also conveys a sense of being completely erased as a human being: “We were lost to such a degree that none of us knew what he was doing and how, and whatever was happening to him. We lost ourselves so much that we were as if lifeless. Driven on we ran like automatons, not knowing whither we were running, what for and what we were doing.” 79 It is hard to imagine a more extreme state of what Patterson describes as dishonor than this. If we view Birkenau as a slave system with identity politics at its core rather than treating it as some kind of abstract “total” system of control or impenetrably banal bureaucracies, the other side of the master-slave divide also appears in a new light.

    The SS men who drove the Special Details to their work seemed to have derived sport from the humiliation of their victims. The very “efficiency” of extermination quickly became the substance of mirth, the substance of what philosopher Jonathan Glover has called the “Cold Joke”: The cold joke mocks the victims. It is an added cruelty and it is also a display of power: we can put you through hell merely for our mild amusement. It adds emphasis to the difference between 'us' and 'them': we the interrogators are a group who share a joke at the expense of you the victims. It is also a display of hardness: we are so little troubled by feelings of sympathy that we can laugh at your torment. 80 When SS men spoke amongst themselves, back stage so to speak, Filip Müller, a survivor of the Special Details, recalled that they gloated: “[They] were checking by their watches the time it took for the noise inside the gas chamber to cease, cracking macabre jokes while they were waiting, like 'The water in the showers must be very hot to make them scream so loudly.’" Thereafter, "with some considerable pride" as Müller recounts, one of them exclaimed to subordinates, “Well, you two, have you got it now? That's the way to do it!” 81 The industrialized nature of the process, in other words, provided a technique by which SS men projected their sense of superiority, another way in which they acted out the difference between themselves, as masters of “modern” technology, and prisoners, forced to serve it against their will.

     

    The killing center of Auschwitz-Birkenau displayed all the traits of totalitarian slavery that I have sought to emphasize here:

    1) The slaves of
    Auschwitz were set to work on a megaproject of vast proportions, the New Order. This included the construction of “Aryan” settlements and the destruction of ethnic communities as ontological enemies throughout the East.

    2) In the gas chambers and crematoria of Birkenau, this megaproject included an indulgence in scientific and technological dandyism so typical of totalitarian science and technology. These were overly complex and betrayed time lavished on an aesthetization of murder unique to
    Auschwitz. This has been largely overlooked because the modern factory was what appealed aesthetically to the SS. Hardly the object of “rational calculation” or “functional efficiency,” the waste of time and cost this entailed bespoke the messianic technocracy so typical of totalitarian regimes.

    3) Last, the Special Details evinced all the hallmarks of slavery in the service of political religion. It served the abject humiliation of the slave and the exaltation of the master in political religion of National Socialism.

    Conclusion: Political Religion and Slavery in the 20thCentury

     If the Holocaust still counts as unique, it is nevertheless difficult to find a totalitarian slave regime that has not embarked upon some form of human engineering akin to it. Totalitarian states attempt the near total transformation of nature, in which they subsume the soft clay of humanity itself. 82 Typically the authors of such projects attach labels to them like “new order” (hardly original to National Socialism), “great leap,” or the like. These announce the alteration of historical time itself. Another label frequently associated with them is “modernization,” invoked likewise in the name of bringing humankind into the light of history’s ultimate end phase. “Modernization” theory is perhaps more of an economic than a political religion of the 20thcentury, but there can be little doubt that it is capable of generating some of the same horror. Himmler referred to Sachsenhausen, where the SS’s gigantic brick factory was located, as “a completely new, modern concentration camp, expandable at any time, capable of securing the state against national enemies both in peacetime as well as in the case of war mobilization.”83

     

    Another example of the totalitarian potential of millenary “modernizers” might be Indonesia. Suharto’s regime, which came to power amidst much bloodshed in 1965, has often been granted a “pass” as non-totalitarian because its “elites have not inflicted excessive hardship on the masses in pursuit of collective national goals, unlike the suffering caused by Soviet collectivization, China's Cultural Revolution, the partition of India on religious grounds, or the tribal massacres in some new African nations." 84 The fall of Suharto has led many to take a closer look. 85 Suharto’s “New Order” and a “Five Year Development Plan” led to the same phenomenon from which many have wished to distance his regime. In East Timor, in particular, the military embarked on resettlement policy, used concentration camps to remove Timorese citizens to lowland areas, and organized slave labor brigades in order to transform society. This proceeded hand in hand with genocide in a politically caused famine. The Timorese were prevented from farming for their own subsistence. Meanwhile, the regime put people to work building roads and farming cash crops for the enrichment of the military. A vision of modernity guided these efforts and shared a predilection for technology and futurism with early Soviet doctrine or the SS’s own vision of “modernization.”

     

    One social scientist, who surveyed leading Indonesian economists in the 1970s, found that the overwhelming majority believed modernization necessitated the transformation of society, politics, and culture. They believed new technology was the key. Their jargon bordered on the statolatry so common to totalitarian regimes (e.g. bandying about phrases like “the state’s clear expression of practical priorities for guiding society”). Likewise Indonesian economists, many close advisors of the military, believed modernization would modify “counterproductive mental-cultural ways.” 86 Three years after this article appeared, Indonesia embarked upon a campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" in East Timor. Similar to the Holocaust, Indonesia enlisted slave laborers to cleanse the regime of its ontological enemies. By the early 1980s, the military formed chains of Timorese citizens and forced them to march the length and breadth of the island to flush out bush fighters. Along the way considerable numbers of civilians died of starvation and arbitrary brutality. The military did not bother to provide them with food or shelter. This campaign went hand in hand with the development of settlements. Timorese were forced to farm cash crops like coffee, cloves, cumin and other goods. The profits went to the military.

    Although the Portuguese colonists had introduced forced labor to
    East Timor for some of these same ends, the rationale was now far more radical. As historian John Taylor notes: "The military planned to use … resettlement as a basis for a massive economic and social transformation ...” 87 This involved the founding of “model plantations” to contribute to the Five-Year Development Plan, which also began in 1979. Although the clear-cut pursuit of greed clearly played a role, this plan also had a ring eerily similar to settlement campaigns that the National Socialists planned but were prevented from implementing, or that Stalin did implement in the collectivization drive. The Indonesian state forcibly resettled Timorese peasants in "development villages.” New farms were to “set examples of modern agricultural methods for the local populations." 88 In especially desirable regions, the state arranged for the in-migration of Indonesians, accompanied by efforts to introduce "modern" irrigation practices, although the regions in question had already had successful irrigation farming for some time.89The collapse of Suharto’s regime amidst corruption and economic debacle also recalls the outcome of the Soviet Union’s much grander but similar demographic experiments.

    A much better known example, one that combines nationalism, communism, and modernization in one, is Pol Pot’s
    Cambodia. In the late 1970s, the Khmer Rouge largely depopulated Phnom Penh, one of the only even remotely industrialized places in that overwhelmingly rural country. Urban residents found themselves defined as “New People,” ontological enemies whose very existence threatened the success of Red Kampuchea. Forcibly removed to rural areas, they had to build, often by hand and always a great cost in life, massive hydraulic works. These, in turn, were justified in the name of the rapid modernization of the country. “We must create the resources and character to leap forward,” reads the central document of this Plan. 90 History had to be brought to its full flowering with breathtaking speed: "Socialism must be built as rapidly as possible, taking us from a backward agriculture to a modern one in from five to ten years, and from an agricultural base to an industrial one in fifteen to twenty years." 91 By 1980, the Khmer Rouge’s Plan called for the near 100% control of all water, subjecting nature itself to party discipline. Like Stalin and Hitler before him, Pol Pot expected untold productivity gains: three tons of rice per hectare instead of the traditional average of one. 92

     

    In the name of a “modern” Cambodia, the regime also seriously discussed building fertilizer factories, coal mines, oil fields, smelting steel, although no coal, iron, or petroleum deposits are known to exist in Cambodia. The reality: the dams and embankments for irrigation farming usually collapsed shortly after they were built.93In this, Cambodia recapitulated the history of the White Sea Canal, the brickworks of the German Earth and Stone Works, or, for that matter, the Crematoria of Birkenau. All these regimes set about some form of the instauration of being; they were political religions of fundamental ontology.94The missions they proclaimed took the form, if not the substance, of the world’s historical religions. In the name of completing the logical destiny ordained by history, each proclaimed a kind of politically perfected heaven on earth to be in reach. As one comparative study of genocide notes, "Only the terminology changed: heretics became reactionaries; sinners became enemies; and conversion became reeducation. What did not change was that … the holy grail of a perfected future justified any means of persecution." 95 All generated “megaprojects,” which in turn generated a demand for slave labor.

     

    Totalitarian slavery occurs when ontological enemies are forced to serve—not merely the practical ends of the state—but a boundless, world historical mission. Enemies are attacked not so much due to their actual resistance or even due to their thought or opinions. Their very being is supposed to create a state of civil war and impede the conclusion of history’s logical course. Slave systems put them to work against this “nature.” This differs markedly from other modern slave systems, not least in its hostility to economic rationale. Typically the slavery of political religions puts ontological enemies to work on works of startling hubris and unreality. These, on the other hand, invariably count as the most sacred, highest priorities of the state. National Socialism evolved projects ranging from monumental building schemes to vast demographic engineering projects to a last ditch effort to move war production underground into “impregnable” factories. I have also tied to show that the SS accomplished the Holocaust itself by forcing its ontological enemies to work in a system of totalitarian science and technology. The SS forced Jews into Special Details, which had to liquidate their very brethren in uniquely designed gas chambers. Last, the technology of genocide was a source of pride; it imparted a sense of superiority to its masters and abject humiliation to its slaves. The crematoria were smaller but no less typical of other megaprojects, merely a piece of a vast social engineering project whose dimensions we will thankfully never know. Defeat put an end to it, but the Holocaust was only its beginning.


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NOTES

    1 Patterson,
    Orlando. Slavery and Social Death. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982
    2 Burleigh, Michael. "Political Religion and Social Evil." Totalitarian movements and Political Religions 3 (2002). Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (
    New York, 2000): Hannah Arendt, Part Three of Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951).
    3 Himmler to Oswald Pohl,
    23 Mar. 42, BAK NS19/2065. For Stalin’s similar expectation see Applebaum
    4 Although he does not present it in this way, Richard White’s treatment of the Columbia River might clearly be considered the history of a megaproject in Graham’s terms, to name just one example: Richard White, Organic Machine or compare the aesthetics, labor, and scale of the Hoover dam: David Nye, American Technological Sublime

    5 Loren Graham, What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experience? (Standford,1998)
    6 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, 1957).
    7 Loren Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the
    Soviet Union(Cambridge, 1993). Graham, What Have We Learned?, Paul Josephson, "'Projects of the Century' in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev," Technology and Culture 36 (1995, 1995), Paul Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology (Atlantic Highlands, 1996), Thomas Zeller and Paul Josephson, "The Transformation of Nature under Hitler and Stalin," in Science and Ideology: A Comparative History, ed. Mark Walker (New York, 2003).Nicolas Werth, "A State against its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union," in The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, ed. et al. Stephane Courtois(Cambridge, 1999).
    8 Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology: 106.
    9 I owe this term to Matthew Payne, for which I thank him.

    10 Werth, "A State against its People,"

    11 Michael Burleigh, "Political Religion and Social Evil," Totalitarian movements and Political Religions 3 (2002

    12 That planning, rationality, technology, or the Enlightenment caused the Holocaust or Stalinism’s running amok is an argument whose popularity seems never to wane. Scarcely original, it has been popularly resurrected in some form almost every decade since the Second World War. One can track its lineage from Jacques Ellul and Martin Heidegger to Zygmunt Bauman and James Scott. See, for example, Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York, 1964). Martin Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge: 1. Einblick in das was ist Bremer Vorträge 1949 (Frankfurt am Main, 1994); Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, ed. William Lovit (trans.) (New York, 1977). Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, 1989). James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, 1998).

    13 Rational calculation has been a part of modern slave systems, and no doubt will continue wherever the practice persists in a globalized economy. A good review can be found in the introduction to David Brion Davis, Slavery and Human Progress (Oxford, 1984). The lively debate among economic historians over the contribution of slavery to the industrial revolution demonstrates that, at the very least, slavery is quite compatible with modern economies.Kennethh Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, 2000). Still, this cannot account for what is unique in totalitarian slavery or the boundlessness viciousness it generates.
    14 Compare Wolfgang Sofsky, Die Ordnung des Terrors: Das Konzentrationslager (Frankfurt amMain, 1993).; Gerhard Armanski, Maschinen des Terrors. Das Lager (KZ und GULAG) in der Moderne (Münster, 1993).

    15 Sofsky, Die Ordnung des Terrors: Das Konzentrationslager: 33.

    16 Here and below I follow the analysis of Karin Orth, Das System der nationalsozialistischen Konzentratisnlager. Eine politische Organisationsgeschichte (See previous entry.)

    17 See Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State 1933-1945 (Cambridge, 1991).
    18 In the case of race-based regimes, as Ben Kiernan notes, "The 'rejection of the individual in favor of the race' did not privilege individuals for their membership in a preferred race but on the contrary it made them vulnerable to measures to protect it." Ben Kiernan, "Twentieth-CenturyGenocides: Underlying Ideological Themes from
    Armenia to East Timor," in The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, ed. Ben Kiernan and Robert Gellately(Cambridge, 2003) Stalinism, in which race never played the same role, still notoriously degraded the condition of Soviet workers—in the name of a workers’ utopia.
    19 Reichsminister im Auftrag, Dr. Timm to Pohl (as Ministerialdirektor), 2 Jan. 40 and Schnellbrief from Schulze-Fielitz (OT), 5 Dec. 39 and Chef HAHB to Neubauleitung Flossenbürg, 27 Nov. 39, BAK NS4/34 Fl. I would like to thank Paul Jaskot for pointing me to the BAK NS4 Flossenburgcollection and sharing his own research notes with me.
    20 Maurer's memo to Kommandanten 27 July 1943
    "Bewachung der Häftlinge," BAP PL5: 42053, under the header of Office D1, thus probably in cooperation with Arthur Liebehenschel. This included new “Lagerordnung für Häftlinge,” NO-517.
    21 Walter Salpeter to Reichsfinanzministerium Dr. Asseyar, 5 February 1941
    , “Steuerpflicht derDEST,“ NA: T-976, Roll 25.
    22 From January of 1939, cited after Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial State, 175.
    23 Pohl to Reichskommissar für die Preisbildung, 19 September 1941
    , "Erklärung nach §22 KWVO der demVuWHA angeschlossenen Gesellschaften," T-976/3.
    24 Pohl to Reichskommissar für die Preisbildung, 19 September 1941
    , "Erklärung nach §22 KWVO der demVuWHA angeschlossenen Gesellschaften," T-976/3.
    25 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (
    Cambridge, 1982)
    26 From “Der Hoheitsträger,” a journal circulated among Nazi leadership circles. Cited in JeremyNaokes, "Leaders of the People? The Nazi Party and German Society," Journal of Contemporary History 39 (2004, 2004)

    27 Richard Bessel, "The Nazi Capture of Power," Journal of Contemporary History 39 (2004), Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1989).

    28 Tom Segev, Die Soldaten des Bösen. Zur Geschichte der KZ-Kommandanten (Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1992). See also Testimony of Oswald Pohl, Protocol: 1327-9.
    29 Theodor Eicke, 1 October 1933
    , "Disziplinar- u. Strafordnung für das Gefangenenlager (Dachau)" and "Dienstvorschriften für die Begleitpersonen und Gefangenenbewachung," BAP, PL5: 42053.
    30 Staatssekretär des RJM-Berlin, Dr. Jur. Roland Freisler, “Arbeitseinsatz im Strafvollzug“ (Title Article for 13 September, 1940), Deutsche Justiz 102 (1940), 1021-25.
    31 Theodor Eicke, 1 October 1933
    , "Disziplinar- u. Strafordnung für das Gefangenenlager (Dachau)" and "Dienstvorschriften für die Begleitpersonen und Gefangenenbewachung," BAP, PL5: 42053.Hans-Günter Richardi, Schule der Gewalt. Das Konzentrationslager Dachau 1933-34 (München, 1983).: 119-54.
    32 Thüringen's regional Innenminister, Hillmuth Gommlich, from 24 April 1937
    , quoted in Paul Jaskot, The Architecture of Oppression: The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental BuildingEconomy (New York, 2000). Here and below I follow much of Jaskot’s analysis.

    33 Jan Van der Vat, The Good Nazi: The Life and Lies of Albert Speer (New York, 1997). Der Spiegel published articles on this family feud in the early 1970s. Enno Georg, Die Wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen der SS (1963).: 44-45. For sound analysis see Jaskot, "Architectural Policy":  Brenner, “Der ‘Arbeitseinsatz’ der KZ-Häftlinge in denAußenlagers Flossenbürg,“ See also Mummenthey and Salpeter, 31 July 1941, "Geschäftsbericht der DESt 1940," T-976/26: 1-516.
    34 Jaskot, The Architecture of Oppression: The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental BuildingEconomy
    35 On the failure of such political rituals in the Enlightenment and some insights into their terrifyingsuccess in other regimes, see Mona Ozouf, Festival and the French Revolution (
    Cambridge, 1988).
    36 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Memoirs (New York, 1970)
    37 “Mindener Bericht,” (written by WVHA officers in Allied captivity in
    Minden, probably, Mummenthey, Volk, and Hoffmann) reprinted in Walter Naasner, SS-Wirtschaft und SS-Verwaltung. 'Das SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt und die unter seiner Dienstaufsichtstehenden wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen' und weitere Dokumente (Düsseldorf:, 1998)..
    38 See chapter 3 of Michael Thad Allen, The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps (
    Chapel Hill, 2002). 39 Michael Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge, 1995).
    40 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (New York: Anchor Books, 1989): 322. Eksteins focuses on the technological means of the Holocaust as its quentiscential modernity.
    41 Dr. Leo Volk, signed by Pohl, 4 September 1941
    , “Stichworte zu den Ausführungen desGruppenführers für die Ansprache bei der Amtschefsitzung,“ NA: T-976, Roll 35. See also, Volkto Pohl, 1 September 1941, “Umorganization der Ämter,” T-976, Roll 35.
    42 SS officer quoted in Josef Marszalek, Majdanek Konzentratiosnlager Lublin (
    Warsaw, 1984)
    43 Himmler’s speech on 9 June 1942
    , cited after Götz Aly, 'Endlösung' Vokerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden (Frankfurt am Main, 1995).: 292.
    44 Himmler reply to Pohl and Kammler, 31 January 1942
    , BAK: NS19: 2065. Note here again the total absence of preoccupation with SS armaments factories.
    45 NO-1292, Kammler to Glücks, 10 March 1942
    , “Einsatz von Häftlingen, Kriegsgefangenen, Juden usw. für die Durchführung des Bauprogrammes des SS-WVHA, Amtsgruppe C 1942.“
    46 Himmler's notes on Kammler to Himmler, 10 February 1942
    , “Aufstellung von SS-Baubrigaden für die Durchführung von Bauaufgaben des RFSS im Kriege und Frieden,” BAK: NS19/2065.
    47 I thank Mark Spoerer for these estimates of German gross domestic product. See also Christoph Buchheim, "Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Dritten Reich--mehr Desaster als Wunder. Eine Erwiderung auf Werner Abelshauser," Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49 (2001, 2001)

    48 Himmler to Richard Glücks, 26 January 1942, BDC: Hängeordner 643. See also ArthurLiebehenschel to all Konzentrationslager, 19 January 1942, “Überstellung von Juden,” printed inHarry Stein, Juden in Buchenwald (Weimar: Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, 1992). This decree orders the immediate transfer of the “number of Jews able to work to the POW Camp Lublin as reported by teletype“ (received on the 26th). It mentions a teletype from the 8thof December. Note this predated serious talks of Konzentrationslager armaments works with Speer or Walther Schieber. I thank Peter Witte for providing this document.
    49 Himmler to Pohl, 19 December 1941
    , BAK, NS 3/52, quoted in Orth, Das System der nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager
    50 R-129, Pohl’s report to Himmler, 30 April 1942
    .
    51 Kammler to Himmler, 1 July 1943
    , BAK NS19/2065
    52 Ibid.
    A report one year later lists all of the SS independent industrial endeavors, none of which was an armaments firm: NO-551, Unsigned, 30 September 1943, “Die Wirtschaftsunternehmungen der Schutzstaffel.“
    53 Erhard Milch to Maurer, 13 April 1943
    , NA: T-175, Roll 80.
    54 Jägerstabbesprechung, 31 March 1944
    , BA MA RL3/4 and "Schnellbericht," 6 March 1944, BA MARL3/10. This was in spite of the objections of the RLM. Chronik, 5 January 1944 and 10 January 1944. MarkSpoerer estimates the GDP of Germany at about 150 billion in 1942. I thank him for this information.
    55 PS-1584(I), Hermann Göring to Heinrich Himmler, 15 February 1944
    , "Aufstellung der 7.Staffel/Fliegergruppe zB V. 7.”Betrand Perz, Projekt Quarz. Steyr-Daimler-Puch und das Konzentrationslager Melk (Wien, 1991). Florian Freund, 'Arbeitslager Zement.' Das Konzentrationslager Ebensee und die Raketenrüstung (Wien, 1989).:Manfred Bornemann, Geheimprojekt Mittelbau: Die Geschichte der deutschen V-Waffen Werke (München, 1971). Chronik, 5/44. "Vermerk über die Besprechung am 16.3.44, Verlagerung von Fertigung untertage" and MR Richter, 11 May 1944, "Unterirdische Verlagerungen," R7/1173. Jägerstabbesprechung, 15 April 1944, BA MA RL3/5. Jägerstabbesprechung, 31 March 1944, BA MA RL3/4. "Anordnung über die Errichtung des "Jägerstabes", 13 March 1944, BDC Ordner 274. Anonymous, 1 May 44, "Durchführung der baulichen Arbeiten für die unterirdische Verlagerung"; Meffert, 1 Feb. 44, "Kommission für unterirdische Verlagerungen"; and Stobe-Dethleffsen to Kammler, 21 Dec. 43, "Bombensichere Ausweichbauten," BAP 46.03/68.

    56 Ralf Schabel, "Wenn Wunder den Sieg bringen sollen: Wehrmacht und Waffentechnik imLuftkrieg," in Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-ErichVolkmann (München, 1999).

    57 Michael Salewski, "Die Abwehr der Invasion als Schlüssel zum 'Endsieg'," in Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich VOlkmann (München, 1999).

    58 Jägerstabbesprechung, 31 Mar. 44, BA MA RL3/4.
    59 Michael Thad Allen, "Anfänge der Menschenvernichtung in Auschwitz, Oktober 1941. Eine Erwiderung auf Jan Erik Schulte," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 51 (2003). Robert vanPelt and Debórah Dwork,
    Auschwitz 1270 to the Present (New York, 1996)

    60 Wannsee Conference, "Besprechungsprotokoll," in John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust:Selected Documents in Eighteen Volumes. Vol. 11: The Wannsee Protocol and a 1944 Report onAuschwitz by the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Garland, 1982), 3-17. See also Christian Gerlach, "Die Wansee-Konferenz, das Schicksal der deutschen Juden und Hitlers politische Grundsatzentscheidung, alle Juden Europas zu ermorden," Werkstattgeschichte 18(1997).

    61 Hanelt, "Notiz für Brigadeführer [Globocnik], Stabsbesprechung am 6/8/41,” in USHMM RG-15.027.M: 1:6 (Records of Der SS und Plizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin).
    62 Hanelt, “Arbeitstagung im SS Mannschaftshaus, 11-13 Uhr,” 30/10/41, USHMM RG-15.027.M: 1: 4.
    63 Hanelt, "Entwurf Program für den 9/11/41," in USHMM RG-15.027M:1:4,

    64 Hanelt, “SS Mannschaftshaus-Lublin,” undated, RG-15.027.M: 1: 6. Although undated, this discusses the SS Mannschaftshaus as of 18/3/42 and mentions deportations of the 15thof the month.
    65 Götz Aly, Die Endlösung (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung.
    Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung(Frankfurt/M, 1993).
    66 Sybille Steinbacher, 'Musterstadt'
    Auschwitz. Germanisierungspolitik und Judenmord inOstoberschlesien (München, 2000)
    67 Michael Thad Allen, "The Devil in the Details: The Gas Chambers of Birkenau, October 1941," Holocaust & Genocide Studies 16 (2002). Karin Orth, Das System der nationalsozialistischen Konzentratisnlager. Eine politische Organisationsgeschichte (
    Hamburg,1999)
    68 Jaskot, The Architecture of Oppression: The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental Building Economy. van Pelt and Dwork,
    Auschwitz 1270 to the Present:
    69 Ulmer, Dejaco, and Bischoff, “Entwurf fur das Krematorium, Erdgeschoß,” Plan 933, 1942 Jan19, PMO AuII BW 30/2.
    70 Miklos Nyiszli,
    Auschwitz: A Doctor's Eyewitness Account (New York, 1993): 40. Compare this to the description of Auschwitz’s first, rather shabby morgue in the main camp in Kielar, 1972}, “"With its concrete floor and big metal-topped table, the little room looked rather like a butcher shop.”
    71 Rudolf Kauer to Geschworrenengericht beim Oberlandsgericht, Wien, 21/2/72, Signature V526/1-155, DöW microfilm roll 1108.
    72 Memoir of Zofia Czerwinska-Kossakiewicz, "survivor of Kanada," in Irena Strzelecka, ed., "The Sauna in Eyewitness Accounts and Memoirs," in Teresa Swiebocka, ed., The Architecture of Crime: The Central Camp Sauna in Auschwtiz II-Birkenau (Oswiecim: Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, 2001).
    73 Alfred Franke-Gricksch, undated, from 1943, "Umsiedlungs-Aktion der Juden," printed in Jean-Claude Pressac,
    Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers (NewYork, 1989)

    74 Jan Sehn, Dr. Ing. Roman Dawidowski, and EduardPechalski, "Gutachten," 26/11/46, in Signature V526/1-155, DöW microfilm roll 1107.

    75 Alfred A., video testimony in HVA-SVHF, interviewed by Yitzchak Kerem. Alfred A. was a popular singer among the guards and was able to get himself transferred. Irene W. also relates that her father was inducted into the Sonderkommandos and was shot quickly thereafter because he would not do the work, Irene W., video testimony in HVA-SVHF, interviewed by Ileane Kenney

    76 Abraham, D., survivor video, FVA, T-1835, interview by Gideon Greif and Raphael Rozner, notes by Tamar Arieh.

    77 Saul H., survivor video. In FVA, T-1839, inteview by Raphael Rozner and Gideon Greif, notes by Mandu Sen.

    78 One wide-spread belief among prisoners, within the Sonderkommandos and outside of it, is that the SS planned to systematically liquidate each labor detail every 3 to 4 months. Other survivors of the Sonderkommandos disputed this, however. There can be little doubt, on the other hand, that the Sonderkommandos were liquidated with great frequency. Judging from my research up to thispoint, I would speculate that individual details were murdered when the tasks which they had completed came to an end. Thus, for instance, the Sonderkommandos who exhumed the dead of the two “Bunkers” north of Birkenau seem to have been killed when that task was completed, etc. I doubt very much that the SS developed some kind of systematic murder rotation, and SS men, even those who had no real reason to hide such details, never spoke about testified to such a policy after the war.

    79 Lewental, "Burried Notebook of the Sonderkommando," in Amidst a Nightmare of Crime:Manuscripts of Prisoners in Cremation Squads Found at Auschwitz, edited by Jadwiga Bezwinskaand Danuta Czech, New York: Howard Fertig, 1992: (survivor of SK, 1944, late October?) 80 Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the 20thCentury (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999): See also Berel Lang, The Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide
    81 Müller, Eyewitness
    Auschwitz
    82 Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology: This enthusiasm for modernization was widespread among the SS’s prison managers. See NO-1044, unsigned (Walter Salpeter), undated (from 1940), "Bericht über das erste Geschäftsjahr der Deutschen Versuchsanstalt für Ernährung und Verpflegung.“Similarly, Theodor Eicke’s pronouncements about Sachsenhausen ("A new, great, and modern concentration camp”)
    83  Johannes Tuchel, Konzentrationslager. Organisationsgeschichte und Funktion der 'Inspektion der Konzentrationslager' 1934-38 (Boppard am Rhein, 1991)
    84 Guy Pauker, "
    Indonesia 1979: The Record of Three Decades," Asian Survey 20 (1980):
    85 Benedict Andersson, "
    Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perrspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (1983), Mark van Langenberg, "Gestapu andState Power in Indonesia," in The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb (Clayton, 1990).
    86 MacDougall, 1976 Only five out of sixty believed that modernization involved strictly economic, rather than political and cultural, transformation; only eight mentioned the equitable distribution of income as a worthy goal. 87John
    Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom (New York, 1999):

    88 Helen Fein, "Violence and the State: Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State Murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966," Comparative Studies in Society and History 35 (1993).
    89 Taylor,
    East Timor
    90 David
    Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and chanthou Boua, Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Doocuments from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977 (New Haven, 1988): 
    91 "Preliminary Explanation Before Reading the Plan,” by the Party Secretary, 21/8/76
    , printed in Ibid
    92 David
    Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (Boulder, 1992):
    93Ibid
    94 I am adopting this term from the late Richard Wolin, Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Kalr Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (
    Princeton, 2001). and The Metaphysics of Being.
    95 Frank Chalk and Kurt Johnassohn, "Introduction," in The History and Sociology of Genocide, ed.idem (New Haven, 1990).


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    Prisoners of War and the German High Command:
    The British and American Experience

    Vasilis Vourkoutiotis.
    Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003

    Reviewed by: Paul Boytinck, Bucknell University.
    Published by:
    H-German (June, 2004)

    Geneva Convention Vindicated

    What Lord Byron called the brain-splattering, throat-cutting art of war received a modest but measurable setback with the ratification of the Geneva Convention of 1929, and its provisions for the protection of prisoners of war. Vasilis Vourkoutiotis believes that the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or Armed Forces High Command) and the German Army adhered to the Geneva Convention of 1929 in the case of American, British and Canadian prisoners of war during World War II, but argues that the execution of Allied escapees, the Commando Order and the use of some Allied airmen as human shields, notably in Frankfurt am Main, were clear violations engineered and implemented by Hitler, Göring and the SS.

    The work is solidly based on the archival records, and it shuns works of reminiscence, autobiography and memoirs. The facts have been diligently researched in the German archives, most notably those of the Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv in Freiburg, to verify the German part of the author's case. Vourkoutiotis has also consulted the records of the Public Record Office (PRO) in London, the National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C. and the National Archives of Canada (NAC), Ottawa, to document the provisions of the German prisoner of war guidelines and to gain indirect access to the inspection reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross. (The International Committee files copies with the nations concerned.) The result is a specialized monograph which gives an indispensable overview of the operation of a prisoner of war camp that adheres to the Geneva Convention.

    The number of prisoners captured reflected the fortunes and vagaries of the war. The Germans won the early battles and British prisoners outnumbered those of their German counterparts by a factor of ten to one. In November 1940, the Germans held 39,956 British prisoners while the total number of Germans in British captivity was a mere 3,594 prisoners. In July 1941, the Germans held 50,717 British prisoners but only 5,010 Germans were prisoners in British camps. In December 1942, the Germans held 2,480,974 prisoners of all nationalities but rough parity was achieved on a more narrow sector in July 1944 when the British and Americans held 186,375 Germans and the Germans held 176,688 British and Americans in camps from Germany to occupied Poland.

    To deal with these prisoners, the Germans were obliged to house them in appropriate structures. Section 9 of the Convention stipulated that prisoners could be "interned in any town, fortress or other place with fixed limits". They were not to be exposed to the fire zones or located in areas subject to bombardment or used as hostages or human shields to prevent bombardment. However, Dr. Alfons Waltzog, in his 1942 update of German policies concerning Allied prisoners of war, wrote that "areas prone to enemy air-raids, but not actual zones of fighting by enemy armies, were legitimate sites" for the location of POW camps . What this gloss or directive meant in practical terms at the time is unclear. It would seem to indicate that Waltzog's intention was to flout the Geneva Convention, but the author does not pursue the practical or criminal repercussions of Waltzog's ruling in detail. In any case, Vourkoutiotis does make it perfectly clear that the German High Command did not intend to leave its prisoners at the mercy of the annihilating thunderbolts, or torrents of friendly fire, from the sky. In October 1942 the OKW ordered air-raid shelters to be made available to prisoners and further stipulated that these shelters were to match those offered to German civilians wherever possible.

    The Germans, who moved their prisoners by rail, often put them up in castles, forts, or former schools close to a railway line. What was called a Dulag (Durchgangslager or transit camp) normally consisted of six thousand men but a Stalag (Stammlager or POW camp for soldiers excluding officers) included up to ten thousand with a ratio of one German guard or staff member for every seven/ten prisoners. As a precaution, "the permanent camps [for British and American airmen] were generally located in the eastern districts.to make escape difficult for pilots". When, later on in the war, these unfortunates had to be evacuated due to the advance of the Soviet Army, they endured daily marches of between 20 and 25 kilometers (12.42 and 15.53 miles) per day. At one point in this evacuation late in the war, Hitler directly intervened. "On February 14, 1945, in response to an inquiry concerning British and American prisoners of war who were too ill to march with others being evacuated from the camps at Sagan and Lamsdorf, Hitler personally decided, contrary to both the Geneva Convention and previous official German policy, that they were not to be left behind. They were to be brought back with the first available train returning after delivering supplies to the Front".

    Food for the prisoners was always one of the major bedeviling issues, and the author makes it clear that the provision of food was a problem in both world wars. "The British Manual of Military Law and the German Kriegsbrauch [i.e., Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (Manual for War on Land)] ... took the requirements of the [1907] Hague Convention to mean that the prisoners of war were entitled to the same rations as the Detaining Power's peacetime troops, but neither country actually gave their prisoners of war these rations. The British came close to the required rations before cutting them, along with the civilian population's rations, in January 1916 and again in June 1918. The German rations for the prisoners of war were significantly worse, leading in some cases to near-starvation and disease among the British prisoners; almost mirroring the case a quarter of a century later, parcels arriving through the intermediary offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross made a significant difference for the British prisoners, as by 1918, because of the complete British blockade of all items, Germany no longer had the resources to meet the needs of its own armed forces, let alone the prisoners of war. For this reason, the Germans decided to supplement their own rations with donations from the International Committee of the Red Cross. In December 1941, the food rations of the POWs were reduced by one third; the shortfall was to be made good by food parcels distributed by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The author writes that on October 10, 1942, the bread ration was set at 800 grams (or 28.21 ounces) per day while sick prisoners were entitled to 225 grams (or 7.9 ounces) of sugar per week and the magnificent beer ration stood at 3 to 5 liters (or 3.17 and 5.28 quarts) per month. Furthermore, to assure the prisoners that they were receiving an adequate food supply "it was standard practice to publish a complete menu indicating the calories and rations, thus allowing the Men of Confidence [Vertrauensmänner, or Camp Representatives] and the Protecting Power delegates to compare the prisoners' menu to the official German rations. Most importantly as regards discipline, all collective disciplinary measures affecting food were prohibited by the Geneva Convention". It was a central and immensely important stipulation. It meant that the detaining power could not impose its will or compel obedience by starvation.

    Although Vourkoutiotis does not raise the subject of the normal death rate in the prisoner of war camps--it was probably in the range of four deaths per thousand per year, as even relatively young men are mortal--he does cover a number of serious violations of the Geneva Convention in dispassionate fashion. They include the shackling of prisoners after capture; the Commando Order of 1942; the execution of recaptured Allied escapees by firing squad; official conniving at the lynching or killing of prisoners by enraged civilians; and the attempted use of prisoners as human shields against air attacks.

    The shackling of prisoners (Germans, British and Canadian) evidently began with the discovery, after the failure of the 1942 Dieppe Raid, of German prisoners with "arms bound in such a way that they would eventually, and did, strangle themselves" (p. 187). The number of German dead is not given, and the Allied unit responsible is not, of course, identified. The Germans, however, exacted a collective punishment by shackling their Canadian and British prisoners. The reprisal apparently did not lead to Allied deaths, and to judge by reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the condition of the 381 manacled prisoners in the officers' camp of Oflag VII B Eichstädt, the ordered reprisal in this camp was implemented in such a way that "it was an inconvenience as it was applied, rather than a serious problem".

    The one besetting problem with the Geneva Convention is that there is no effective means to protect captured troops on the battlefield as opposed to the rear areas, and that brings us directly to the Commando Order. The author's discussion of Hitler's Commando Order is very brief, and his failure to give a copy of the order in the original German along with a translation is an inexplicable omission. He writes, "the Commando Order of October 18, 1942, was issued by Hitler in conjunction with the shackling order for Canadian and other British prisoners of war. After the raid at Dieppe, by mostly Canadian soldiers and British commandos, had been repulsed, members of both the German armed forces and the Todt organization had been found with their arms bound in such a way that they would eventually, and did, strangle themselves. Further, a British close-quarters combat manual was purportedly found which instructed commandos to keep prisoners alive only insofar as it was expedient.... Henceforth, regardless of whether they fought in uniform or as spies or franc-tireurs, Allied commandos caught fighting outside major military beach-heads or war zones were to be killed rather than taken prisoner [and the order's implementation] ... represented an obvious breach of international law committed by the OKW (not just the Nazi military structures), and was easily proven to be a war crime at Nuremberg. It is, of course, possible to argue with the judgment that this breach was one committed by the OKW and the German Army; the order, after all, originated with Hitler and not the officer corps, and it is my belief that high and low-ranking officers of the OKW who disagreed with the policy in private were bullied and coerced into giving their assent against their will and better judgment.

    It should also be added that the killing of prisoners in World War II was by no means a German monopoly. In the research for his book Overlord: D-Day and the Battle of Normandy, Max Hastings discovered that "among scores of Allied witnesses interviewed for this narrative, almost every one had direct knowledge or even experience of the shooting of German prisoners during the campaign. In the heat of battle, in the wake of seeing comrades die, many men found it intolerable to send prisoners to the rear knowing that they would thus survive the war, while they themselves seemed to have little prospect of doing so. Many British and American units shot SS prisoners routinely, which explained, as much as the fanatical resistance that the [Waffen-] SS so often offered, why so few appeared in POW cages." [1] It would also be very revealing to read any reports by the International Committee on the condition of American, British and Canadian prisoner of war cages and camps for German soldiers and their European allies in France during the course of hostilities in 1944-45.

    Many books and even more demotic films concentrate on the sensational theme of escape to the exclusion of all other issues. Vourkoutiotis does not. He remarks that the German use of dogs to guard prisoners was modified in 1940, when "the previous practice of allowing guard dogs to run freely between perimeter fences was prohibited; from then on, all guard dogs had to be kept on a leash". Later, he gives some really startling statistics on the overall number of escapes from German custody. From January to September 1942, it appears that "1,175 Officers (of whom 678 were Russians) and 77,628 noncommissioned officers and men (of whom 35,208 were Russians) had escaped their captivity. Dealing with this problem cost 620,000 lost work hours for the German economy, in addition to the increased threat to the internal security of Germany". The reasons for this very high total of escapes by prisoners of war are not explored in more detail. Whether Hitler knew the details of what he would undoubtedly have considered a scandalous state of affairs is unclear. In any case, he decided to act in 1944 and personally gave the order to execute the recaptured escapees from Stalag Luft III Sagan. (The copy of this order is also not part of this book.)

    “The shooting of the 47 recaptured prisoners of the 'Great Escape' from Stalag Luft III Sagan constituted perhaps the single greatest crime against British or American prisoners of war during the war.... As was made clear at the Nuremberg Trials, the actual murders of the prisoners were not carried out by Wehrmacht troops, but by the SS, and were conducted further at the personal behest of Hitler. It might be added that if the execution of these escapees was intended to serve as a deterrent, it seems to have failed in accomplishing its purpose, and it was therefore both criminal and pointless. The fact is that the problem of escaping prisoners continued to plague the Germans even after this mass execution in 1944. As late as March 1945, General Alfred Jodl sent a jovial memo to military district XIII (most probably Wehrkreis XIII in Nuremberg), to let camp commandants know that even a single escape would cost them their heads. It is, all in all, a strange and baffling state of affairs, and the underlying reasons why so many Allied prisoners were at large in Germany during the war years are never made totally clear in the narrative.

    In the same vein, the author explores the violation of the Geneva Convention by German civilians who, enraged or made mad by grief and despair, either killed or connived in the killing of some of the unfortunate downed members of the Allied air crew who were shot down over Germany. The total number of these victims, whose fate could not materially alter the course of the air war in the slightest degree, was thirty-nine men; and, while Vourkoutiotis tried to get more accurate figures, he failed to come up with a more definitive total. One of his more interesting explorations concerns what he calls Göring's attempt to use the prisoners as human shields, and he suggests that Frankfurt was the site selected for this experiment, but the presentation of the sketchy facts of the case does not make for a convincing argument. While Frankfurt was blasted and bombed as we know full well, we are not told how many of the airmen located in the Frankfurt transit camp were killed in the raid or raids. [2]

    Vourkoutiotis does not mention it, but it is highly probable that the greatest cause of excess mortality among Allied POWs was the villainy called friendly fire. It consisted of high explosives, incendiaries and machine-gun belts of ammunition delivered by Lancaster bombers, B-17 Flying Fortresses, and Mustang fighter bombers, against little or negligible opposition. The Germans, as previously noted, were not at liberty to expose their prisoners to this bombardment, and they issued rules and regulations about it. The aim was to provide air raid shelters equivalent to those provided to German civilians. Given that an estimated 600,000 civilians died in these attacks, the proviso is apt to pall.

    Other rules applied. The prisoners were to remain in housing or shelters during air raids or risk the death penalty for looting. The guards escorting prisoners during train journeys were asked to prepare contingency plans if the train was attacked. Generally, guards and prisoners of war were to take the same evasive action as the rest of the train, and the guards were to keep the prisoners within their line of sight during this action, a stipulation that I suspect was the source of much mirthless laughter among their ranks. "In mid-September 1944, the OKW ordered that they be notified by telex of prisoners of war killed during an air-raid only if there were more than seven killed". This order surely suggests that the OKW kept an overall record of the total number of Allied prisoners killed during these air attacks, but the book does not anywhere give this total.

    The Allied bombing offensive affected the prisoners indirectly as well as directly. Red Cross inspectors who visited Stalag X B Sandbostel in March and April 1945 noted catastrophic conditions when many of the 2,143 prisoners were transferred west from camps in the east, and found that "the recent bombings of Bremen (from where the camp used to receive its bread supplies) meant that there was no more bread available, and the prisoners were given more potatoes instead". This report does not sound like the depths of deprivation, but we have to imagine a group of 2,000 weary and ravenous young men much emaciated by their trek, perhaps by forced marches of between 20 and 25 kilometers (12.42 and 15.53 miles) per day. One other proof of the danger posed by the bombing campaign is that the Red Cross inspections, which had averaged around one hundred visits per quarter during the war, were reduced to nine camp visits during the spring of 1945, when the bomber offensive was arguably at its most bitterly destructive phase. The 1945 inspections revealed, as we would expect, a decline in overall conditions: some three of the camps were satisfactory, three were poor and another three dangerously inadequate. What is clear is that by 1945, the visits were few and far between. It had plainly become too dangerous for the Red Cross inspectors to check for dangerous camp conditions.

    The book includes minor errors and omissions. The Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv is said to be located in Freiburg im Bresgau, not Breisgau (p. 256). The OKH on one occasion appears as the "Oberkommando der Heer" rather than "Oberkommando des Heeres", a minor error that nevertheless makes a German reader flinch. These are exceptions, not the rule. Hundreds of OKW memo titles are meticulously and correctly transcribed in the notes. Gottlob Berger's title of Chef des Kriegsgefangenenwesen is never translated into English as Director of Prisoner of War Department in the text as opposed to the notes. The German Vertrauensmann (a man who merits or deserves one's trust) is here translated literally as "Man of Confidence." This translation is too literal and is not good idiomatic English; it connotes the villainous "confidence man," the total opposite of the trustworthy "Man of Confidence." For these reasons, it would probably be better if Vourkoutiotis and others translated Vertrauensmann as "Camp Representative" and have done with it. The men who filled the position were responsible men with difficult assignments. Furthermore, some of the officials on the German side are not properly identified. They include Dr. Waltzog, evidently a German lawyer who provided legal glosses and interpretations of selected sections of the Geneva Convention, as well as Berger, the Chief of the Prisoner of War Department for a number of years. Brief biographical sketches of both men would have been helpful. Then again, is it really true that the Allied prisoners received 28 ounces of bread as part of their diet when the staple of the German diet, from east to west and north to south, was undoubtedly that nutritious carbohydrate, the common potato? And finally, a thick and impenetrable tangle of text appears on pages 31-34. It turns out to be a long list of German POW camps, the sort of thing only an author or archive rat could love. It should have been unceremoniously stuffed into an appendix.

    The book also raises some curious questions of substance and procedure. Why should we assume that all these OKW rules and regulations were actually followed by harried German camp commandants on the ground? The fundamental and most convincing answer to this question is surely that Switzerland was the Protecting Power during most of the war, and Swiss roving inspectors made sure that the provisions of the Geneva Convention were followed. But it is never quite made clear by what means the OKW conferred with the Swiss legal representatives when it issued some of its more controversial rulings or regulations. Specifically, when Waltzog ruled in 1942 that "areas prone to enemy air-raids, but not actual zones of fighting by enemy armies, were legitimate sites" for the location of POW camps, did he discuss this ruling with his Swiss counterparts? And did they concur with his interpretation? And if so, on what grounds? These are not academic questions, but matters of life and death. We have it on the authority of R. H. S. Crossman, the cabinet minister in Harold Wilson's government and Member of Parliament for Coventry (Coventry and Dresden are "twinned" cities and Crossman had many occasions to visit the German city), that some 25,000 Allied prisoners of war were quartered in and around Dresden in February 1945. This fact was known in London and Washington before the raid, but the order to attack was given nevertheless. [3] Another source tells us that the Dresden attack killed at least seventy-one Allied prisoners of war. [4]

    Vourkoutiotis, in the one instance where he directly confronts the question of OKW credibility, observes in passing that the secondary literature of biography, reminiscences and memoirs supports his conclusions. This observation is largely true, but it would have made for a better book if he had included some of the major statements from the reputable secondary sources. David Wild, British Army chaplain, who spent five years as a prisoner of war in Germany, many of them in and around Torun, Poland, attests to the truth of the matter in his admirable memoir: "An impression may be given in these pages that life was not all that hard in German captivity. It is true that we were fortunate to be prisoners of the German army. With that strange attachment to what is "korrekt," they frequently protected us from being subjected to the brutality and ruthlessness of the Gestapo and the SS, and made a show of conforming most of the time to the requirements of the Geneva Convention." [5] They made, as Wild's book and this book show all too well, more than a show of conforming to the Convention.

    Notes

    [1]. Max Hastings, Overlord; D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)

    [2]. When he visited the city in 1945, John Dos Passos wrote "Frankfurt resembles a city as much as a pile of bones and a smashed skull on the prairies resembles a prize Hereford steer." Tour of Duty (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946)

    [3]. R. H. S. Crossman, "Apocalypse at Dresden," Esquire, 60, no. 5 (November 1963)

    [4]. Dick Sheehy, "Dresden Plus 93 Days," History Today, 45, no. 5 (May 1995)

    [5]. David Wild, Prisoner of Hope (Lewes, Sussex: Book Guild, 1992)


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