V-2 Trivia

· Hitler personally determined the V-2 targets (London, Antwerp, Paris, etc.) He rejected use of the rocket on the Eastern Front

· Von Braun was opposed to the establishment of a V-2 production plant at Peenemünde.

· As early as 1935, in a meeting with General Becker on planning for the A4 and Peenemünde, Von Braun advocated spaceflight as the ultimate program objective.

· Dornberger served under General von Brauchtisch in the Reichswehr. Von Brauchtisch was able to protect the Peenemünde team from takeover attempts by industry, the Air Force, the SS, etc. Speer also was important as a protector. But later even he came into conflict with other groups in the Third Reich, and couldn't prevent the final takeover of the V-2 programme by the SS.

· The film cooling used in the V-2's engine had performance penalties but was necessary, since high-quality metals for the nozzle throat were not available at the time

· The Schwimmweste project involved a floating Wasserfall test stand, and was not connected to the submarine-towed V-2 as indicated in some histories.

· Rocket team member Konrad Dannenberg obtained his early rocketry experience through involvement with Pullenberg's underground rocket group in Hannover. He also witnessed the Opel rocket rail car tests and heard Max Valier lecture.

· The rocket engineer's efficiency was reduced significantly due to their dispersal after the raid Allied raid on Peenemünde of 17 August 1943

· There were serious problems in getting production drawings out that worked. Parts were often defective. Walter "Papa" Riedel was unfairly dismissed over the problem. In all 65,000 changes were made to the missile design between the decision to put it into production and the end of the war.

· Originally it was planned that a horizontal production line be established at Peenemünde in the Versuchsserienwerk (research series production factory).

· The A7 was a subscale version of the winged A9. Considerable resources were expended on it before its cancellation in 1943.

· The Long Range Bombardment Commission observed a 'fly-off' of the V-1 and V-2 on a visit to Peenemünde. The Commission originated in a Luftwaffe plan to kill the Army's V-2. Instead both missiles were approved for production.

· The Peenemünde engineers were under constant threat of being drafted and sent to the front. Reports and results were expected from each engineer without pause in order to justify his draft exemption.

· Combustion/injection research by an American NACA engineer was used in solving V-2 engine problems. Konrad Dannenberg had seen the NACA report at Hannover while working with Pullenberg.

· As far back as the V-2, Von Braun advocated underestimating costs in order to sell projects to the government.

· In mass production, the V-2's combustion chambers and turbopumps were fabricated and tested separately. Based on these test results, they were matched according to their characteristics and mated on the assembly line.

· Reisig, on the Dornberger staff, had to convey endless changes in the missile to the launch troops.

· The use of highly qualified Peenemünde research and development staff for V-2 production was seen as a big waste of effort.

· Walter Riedel was a talented engineer but his lack of academic qualifications led to conflicts with the graduate engineers on the rocket team. Confusingly, he was replaced by Walther Riedel.

· The He-112 rocket aircraft accident was due to base pressure flame suction. This was a valuable experience when the same effect was observed on the A4.

· After takeover of the project by Kammler and the SS, Dornberger's responsibilities were limited to testing ground equipment and continuing development firings of the V-2 from the Blizna SS range in Poland.

· Rudolph and von Braun laid out their plans for spaceflight at the Kummersdorf officer's club in 1935. These studies were the basis for Von Braun's publications in the 1950s on Mars exploration.

· Thiel deserved much of the credit for development of the V-2 engine. His death in the bombing raid of 17 August 1943 was a big loss. If he had lived, the Peenemünde team could have succeeded in completing development of the Mischduese injector plate engine. This had combustion instability problems that could not be overcome before the end of the war. As a result the complex 18 injector 'basket-head' design had to be put into production instead.

· Von Braun decided that the V-2 central records would be saved and hidden. All other files and secondary records were intentionally burned in order to give the central records value as a bargaining chip with the Allies after the war.

· There were no significant tension in the V-2 engineering leadership over Nazi Party or political questions.

· The Wolman Doppler tracking system for the A4 was modified to command V-2 engine cut-off by radio. Later the method of calculating the moment of cut-off was changed to integration of inputs from accelerometers due to fear of Allied jamming of the command signals.

· Von Braun was forced to wear his SS uniform by Dornberger for the meeting with Himmler.

· The in-house laboratory concept for guidance-and-control development at Peenemünde was largely forced by the circumstances of heavy time-pressure and lack of experience in the industry. Its creation was not due to the ideology of the engineers.

· Von Braun was more than a manager at Peenemünde. He also contributed valuable technical solutions, notably in the guidance and control areas.

· Wasserfall engine testing finally led to success with the injector plate and a single combustion-chamber motor. The equivalent A4 engine redesign was sidetracked by the urgency to get the missile into mass production.

· The 1.5 tonne thrust engines for the A3 and A5 were designed at Kummersdorf. At Peenemünde separate work was done in developing 1.4 and 4.2 tonne thrust motors to test the A4 injection system.

· Von Braun arrest was personally ordered by Himmler as revenge for Von Braun's resistance to the V-2 team being taken over by the SS

· Modification of the A4 engine was constant due to changes in available steel and other materials.

· Oberth was interrogated by Dr. Theodore von Karman as part of Project Dustbin after the war.

· The method used to transfer the Wasserfall missile from development to production - assignment of Henschel as prime contractor from the beginning of the process - was superior to the V-2 mess.

· The Allied bombing of Peenemünde of August 17, 1943 was disruptive and resulted in the loss of a few months of development and production work due to dispersion and reorganization. However other raids and the daily air raid warnings were taken in stride and were not disruptive of the work.

· The V-2 was not equipped with a range-safety destruct system. The military did not consider the danger sufficient to warrant the extra expense and complexity.

· The A9/A10 transoceanic missile idea was in fact found to be unworkable due to heat transfer issues.

· War shortages of material forced incorporation of new changes to the V-2 during production. Aluminium had to be used for the liquid oxygen tank. A paperboard tank was considered for the alcohol fuel but never put into production.

· Von Braun accepted an "honorary" rank and subsequent promotions in the SS. He purportedly consulted with others in the rocket development group, deciding that his SS membership would be valuable in protecting the project.

· Von Braun's management style stressed the responsibility of individuals, not committees. He was able to talk to everybody at every level. But often his practice of going around intervening management levels and giving orders to someone else's subordinates caused friction

· The working environment at Peenemünde was contrary to normal rules of military life. Although enlisted men were often supervising officers, it worked.

· The Peenemünde engineers had very little direct contact with the regular Army officers, even socially.

· More V-2 missiles were fired at Allied dock facilities at Antwerp than at London

· Oberth was inspired to study how man could reach space during the apparition of Halley's Comet in 1910.

· Von Braun was heard to say that it would have been preferable to develop rocketry for space travel rather than war. But if it was necessary to develop a war rocket to reach space, he was willing to do so. Dornberger ordered von Braun not to mention space in Hitler's presence.

· Discussion of spaceflight at Peenemünde was only done privately. Such discussions were risky and could only take place within a small, selected group of people.

· A key issue in obtaining missile accuracy was monitoring lateral dispersion of the missile due to wind during ascent. Technical approaches included a radio guide beam or accelerometers to measure lateral motion. Both the accelerometer and radio cut-off systems were used in the field, but the radio system was superior in accuracy. It was found that a three-axis platform was needed to make the lateral accelerometer work, and there were big delays in getting a platform system developed.

· The thrust and planned dimensions of the A10 transatlantic rocket first stage were used to determine the size of the research and production shops and test stands at Peenemünde.

· The V-2 engineers often held "parties with rocket fuel" using the ethyl alcohol delivered as propellant for the rocket. In common with later rocketry projects, the engineers were under tremendous strain and worked very hard but remained enthusiastic.

· As opposed to the rocket diehards, for most people at Peenemünde the working environment was "nothing special".

o The Sg 52 platform and control system developed for the A5 in 1938-39 This was a stable control system based on rate gyros, but was found not to be an ideal solution

o The Sg 66 developed by Kreiselgeräte in 1940-42 for the A4. This electromechanical control system used unbalanced gyro accelerometers and a 'Mischgerät' (mixing device) to combine inputs, thereby eliminating the need for rate gyros. However Kreiselgeräte was only experienced in naval equipment, and applying the principle to rocket guidance was completely foreign to them. Nevertheless, since Kreiselgeräte was a small company, they could respond with flexibility and speed to the rocket team's requests.

Siemens developed an alternate system based on two gyros to determine attitude and follow a fixed-plane pitch program. The Siemens system was favored up to mid-1942 due to its production simplicity. Siemens also had a greater manufacturing and technical capacity. But its large size made it unresponsive to the rapid pace of development. A surplus Siemens guidance system, or an American copy, was used for the Explorer I launch in 1958.

A third system by Askania-Möller was briefly put into development, but quickly abandoned.

The Kreiselgeräte Sg 70 platform was designed as a replacement for the Sg 66 to eliminate aluminum gimbals in 1944-1945. Kreiselgeräte's development labs were evacuated to Sudetenland in 1943 after air raids in Berlin, impacting development after that date.

The basic A4/A5 aerodynamic configuration was based on the shape of the Wehrmacht "S" model bullet. Refinements were made by trial and error tests in Hermann and Wieselsberger's wind tunnel at Aachen.
One of von Braun's unique contributions was emphasizing horizontal communication between groups to solve problems. He was the primary initiator of this management concept.
Von Braun was a late-riser.
The Peenemünde engineers were poorly prepared for the conversion from laboratory development to production of the A4. Over 65,000 changes were made to the missile.
Klaus Riedel was not effective as head of test stand work. Thereafter Von Braun assigned him to development of the mobile launch system for A4, where he was very successful.
Regener was interested in use of the V-2 for scientific research in the ultraviolet and cosmic ray portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Meetings were held in Friedrichshafen in 1943 to discuss the "Regener Tonne" (Regener one-ton scientific payload). Gröttrup was highly involved in this project.
Kammler wanted to launch test V-2's from Heidelager and Heidekraut against Polish towns behind the Russian lines, but the Army blocked the move.
The in-house research-and-development philosophy of the Von Braun team resulted in problems in getting manufacturers for production. Materials problems made it difficult to get good production quality from contractors.